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Abstract 
The history of colonialism is generally associated with the authoritarian regimes of the 
sixteenth century that expanded their reign for the purpose of material aggrandizement.  
Problems arise, however, when colonial regimes espouse explicit concern for the welfare 
of the subject population.  Through a reading of British colonial discourse on India, as 
represented by the Economist newspaper, John Stuart Mill, George Campbell, and John 
William Kaye, I argue that market capitalism was seen as the means by which 
‘backward’ Indian subjects would be ‘improved.’  But this ‘civilizing mission’ exposed 
Indian society to unprecedented violence as the British sought to enforce its conformity 
to a system of proprietorship and commercial production.  To explain the paradox 
inherent to liberal colonialism I will employ the concept of biopolitics as developed by 
Michel Foucault.  Biopolitics explains how the prioritization of ‘life’ leads, not to 
peaceful existence, but to efforts to eliminate elements of human activity deemed 
inimical to the reproduction of the species.  In colonial India this took the form of 
adjudicating subjects’ ability to adapt to, and create, the circumstances for industry to 
flourish, showing that at its core, British rule in India represented an assault on the 
indeterminacy of life itself.
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What drove my interest in this topic is a contemporary phenomenon.  Namely, the 
continual authorization of mass violence by states most committed to liberty and peace, 
and the ease with which support for these campaigns is mobilized.  The criminal acts of 
the West in the so-called War on Terror became a great concern to me.  I wanted to know 
why, in a world that is increasingly defined by international cooperation, is there a 
simultaneous rise in military aggression, and why is this violence performed with such 
proficiency?  To answer this question in an academic setting was to help me fulfill my 
own engagement with radical politics and identification with social justice movements.   
While reading literature on this topic during my undergraduate degree in 
international studies, I was exposed to the thought of Michel Foucault, and developed a 
particularly strong interest in the concept of biopolitics, meaning ‘life’ as the referent 
object of political power.  I became partial to the explanation that this problem exists 
precisely because ‘life’ has been prioritized; that the proliferation of violence, in other 
words, is linked to efforts to secure the biological existence of humanity and ensure its 
reproduction.   
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I realized that this phenomenon is shaped by a fundamental paradox that exists in 
liberalism.  My awareness of Foucault’s thought also coincided with an interest in 
postcolonial theory and the history of colonialism generally speaking.  Beginning this 
thesis, my goal was to ask, and answer the questions of why liberalism, or political 
regimes that were influenced by liberal ideas, employ violence in the form of colonial 
intervention, and how did the colonial experience shape liberal technologies of 
government?   
British colonialism in India has thus served as a case study with which to examine 
the history of this phenomenon in the nineteenth century.  The subject of my thesis is 
therefore thematic, as opposed to geographically focused on India.  Nor is my thesis 
informed by the tradition of national histories.  It is less about the British Empire than the 
liberal ideas that it represented and put into practice.  The British Empire, in this sense, 
existed as a conduit for the expansion of liberalism.  The ideas and practices I discuss 
were not fundamentally British, nor attached to any form of nationality.  And although I 
use evidence that provides a British perspective on this colonial experience, my goal was 
not to address their shortcomings or failures.  I was not interested in, for example, 
explanations of the Indian mutiny-rebellion that explore what the British could have done 
to prevent it.  I believe this only serves to rationalize colonial rule and reinforce 
ethnocentric attitudes.  As such, I avoided any systematic analysis of the inner-workings 
of the East India Company, or Government of India, but rather considered their effects on 
Indian society.   
Colonial India proved to be an excellent case study to work with, especially 
considering Professor Handy’s knowledge of the history of colonialism, peasants, 
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capitalism and modernity, not to mention his understanding of the theory I use.  My 
thesis is indeed theoretically informed and somewhat ‘outside the box’ in the sense that I 
pushed the boundaries of the discipline.   
It has three main arguments.  The first is that colonialism in India, from the East 
India Company’s conquest of Bengal forward, was biopolitical.  Meaning, it was 
concerned primarily with the welfare of colonial subjects, inasmuch as their improvement 
was essential to the security of the human species.  The second is that the commercial 
dynamics of liberal political economy – or a capitalist order based on modes of private 
property, marketized production and the circulation of commodities, were thought to 
promote the life of Indian subjects.  The third is that this intervention and attempt to 
reorganize Indian society was driven by liberalism’s desire to secure peaceful existence.    
These arguments correspond to the three main chapters in my thesis, each with 
their own sub-arguments.  In chapter 1 I discuss the origins of liberal society in the late 
eighteenth century.  I believe there were numerous specific conflicts in early modern 
Europe that stimulated a desire for peace, but I refer to the anti-imperialism of Scottish 
Enlightenment figure and classical political economist Adam Smith, arguing that 
imperialism took on the same connotation as war.  Conversely, imperialism became an 
expression of liberalism’s militarized origins.  Liberty, on the other hand, could be 
achieved through the correct economic organization of society.  By the nineteenth 
century, though, this vision was inverted such that societies that did not exhibit the 
formula for peace were targeted for intervention – hence the justification to act against 
the ‘threat’ of ‘oriental despotism.’   
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In chapter 2 I show how the construction of liberal political economy was 
perceived by nineteenth century liberals to improve the life of Indian subjects.  According 
to the Economist newspaper, John Stuart Mill, and John William Kaye, it was the 
material prosperity resulting from this capitalist order that allowed Indian society to 
reproduce liberal, or ‘civilized’ forms of life.  Political economy thus acted as a form of 
governance for the East India Company.  By apparently increasing their ability to 
consume, making them productive, and encouraging them to act according to their self-
interest, as opposed to “feudal” obligations, Indian subjects, it was thought, could 
effectively govern themselves during the era of what is now termed ‘indirect rule.’   
Chapter 3 discusses the opposition to liberal political economy as represented by 
the Indian mutiny-rebellion.  This revolt led to an ethnological movement that sought to 
contain anti-colonial resistance through an increased knowledge of Indian races.  While it 
may appear that this knowledge of race was independent of any economic factors, it was 
in fact a pseudo-science that invented categories of human capabilities, and linked race to 
the ability to perform labour.  This is evident in the Economist and the work of George 
Campbell, which show how race became a means of codifying the population, and 
separating who was fit for inclusion in the liberal order, and who should be excluded by 
with justice or death, thereby demonstrating the biopolitics of liberal colonialism.   
Ideologically speaking, my position is that colonialism was inherently violent, and 
in to case benevolent.  In India, it was not only violent because of the atrocities 
committed during the 1857 rebellion and subsequent counter insurgency, but also the 
systemic violence of dispossession and exposure to the international market, and, 
importantly, the targeting of Indian society as a threat to liberal universalism.   
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To make these arguments I used evidence from the colonial discourse of the 
British liberals mentioned above.  The primary sources I used were published works that 
were all available at the University of Saskatchewan.  I should mention that my research 
process was significantly aided by the work Professor Handy and PhD student Carla Fehr 
did going through the Economist, finding everything that was written about India.   
The result, I believe, is a blend of intellectual and socio-political history.  Meaning, my 
evidence comes from the history of ideas found in published works, but only makes sense 
against the backdrop of the historical changes that occurred in India.  To see how I have 
done this requires an acceptance of theory as a methodology.  None of these sources, for 
example, state explicitly that colonialism in India was biopolitical.  Biopolitics is instead 
the descriptive tool used in my interpretation of what British rule in India was. 
This thesis is only a small reflection of what I have learned in my research and 
what I would like to say about this topic.  I realize that is the reality of a Master’s thesis.  
I know I should hesitate to make any claims that go beyond the context of British rule in 
India during the time frame I studied.  With that said, I think there are larger implications 
that are worth noting, and that could possibly lead to future research.  For example, 
reflecting one of my concluding points, I believe that the liberal colonial experience led 
to the development of technologies of government to the point that today’s liberalism is a 
product of it.  Meaning that liberalism cannot exist independently from its colonial 
encounters because it was fundamentally shaped by it.   
History is and will always be important.  My greatest sense of accomplishment 
after writing this thesis comes from what studying the past has taught me about the 
present.   
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INTRODUCTION:  COLONIALISM AND LIBERAL MODERNITY 
The history of colonialism is commonly associated with the authoritarian regimes 
of the sixteenth century that expanded their reign in foreign territories for the purpose of 
resource extraction and religious crusade.  These imperial powers often exploited the 
labour of indigenous populations or actively engaged in their extermination.1  Problems 
arise, however, when colonial regimes espouse explicit concern for the welfare of the 
subject population.  How should colonialism be understood, in other words, when its 
motivations derive from ideas of individual freedom, equality, and democracy – the 
principles that supposedly give rise, that is, to the pacific aims of liberalism?  This thesis 
responds to this question through an examination of the colonial discourse of British 
liberals, as expressed by the Economist newspaper, John Stuart Mill, George Campbell, 
and John William Kaye.  These thinkers sought to distinguish colonial policy and practice 
in India – from the establishment of the East India Company’s (EIC) Permanent 
Settlement of Bengal in 1793, to the aftermath of the Indian mutiny-rebellion of 1857 – 
by its mandate to ‘improve’ the life of the subject population.  During this period, Britain 
was moving toward a quasi-democratic society based on liberal institutions.2  The 
intellectual arguments that influenced this moderate reform were also used to justify the 
subjugation of colonized populations through military occupation.3  A central component 
of Britain’s ‘civilizing mission’ in India was to advance the supposed backwardness of 
peasant existence by integrating their labour into a system of private property, 
commodity production, and wage labour.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert J.C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction, (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2001), 20, 21. 
2 Ibid., 34.   
3 Ibid.    
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The rise of this decidedly liberal colonialism paralleled a shift in the British 
Empire when slavery was replaced with new forms of labour management.  In the 
postemancipation era, market incentives were required as a means to maintain the labour 
that fuelled Britain’s industrialization.4  This period subsequently provoked a new 
imperial vision among liberal political economists, ethnologists, and philosophers.  
According to this vision, Europe represented the pinnacle of a universal history – a 
vantage point thought to grant Europeans the knowledge and moral authority to impose 
progress on ‘backward’ societies, using coercion and violence when deemed necessary.5  
While establishing the basis for civil society in Europe, these ‘moral sentiments’ 
simultaneously found expression in nineteenth century imperialism and the despoliation 
of non-Western peoples.  But unlike earlier examples of colonialism, the consolidation of 
EIC rule in the nineteenth century was understood as a humanitarian duty.6   
Contrary to narratives that understand liberal colonialism as an aberration in an 
otherwise benevolent, if not ideal, form of social, economic, and political organization, I 
argue that colonialism was in fact essential to the historical development of liberalism.  
By this I mean that, while liberalism claimed to free society from the political oppression 
and economic restrictions of autocratic rule, it depended on the violent reordering of 
peasant-based societies, whose very existence was viewed as an impediment to the 
universality on which liberalism seeks legitimacy.  The imperative to emancipate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Theodore Koditschek, “Capitalism, Race and Evolution in Imperial Britain”, in 
Theodore Koditschek, Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua, and Helen A. Neville (eds), Race 
Struggles, (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2009) 50, 60, 61.   
5 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France, 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 21.   
6 Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt, “Introduction”, in Duffield and Hewitt (eds.), 
Empire Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present, (Woodbridge: James 
Curry, 2009), 9, Young, 19, 20.   
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humanity has thus paradoxically encouraged violent intervention into ‘uncivilized’ 
societies in order to enforce their conformity to the ‘virtues’ of liberal political economy.   
Recent scholarship in political science supports this view.  Theorist Julian Reid, 
for example, argues that if liberalism is understood as a project “dedicated to the 
projection of peace through the dissemination of principles of individual liberty, 
democracy, and market capitalism,” then what is striking is not only liberalism’s failure 
to achieve this end, but also the unprecedented means that liberal regimes now have to 
destroy life technologically.7  But this problem is by no means unique to the twenty-first 
century.  It is a recurring theme throughout the history of liberalism, and has been raised 
by numerous scholars.  Theodore Koditschek’s Liberalism, Imperialism, and the 
Historical Imagination, and Jennifer Pitts’s A Turn To Empire, for example, document 
the authorization of violence throughout liberalism’s protracted history, and question its 
ability to emancipate humanity due to its endorsement of imperialism, slavery, and war.8  
As Pitts states, “if liberalism can be said to rest on a commitment to human dignity and 
equality, the support for empire among nineteenth century liberals poses a theoretical 
problem that requires explanation.”9  This is certainly true.  However, although the main 
arguments in these works identify the contradictory aspects of liberal thought and 
practice, they fail to adequately account for why such discontinuity exists.  In their view, 
liberalism is discredited as hypocritical – having not yet realized its ideals of freedom and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Julian Reid, “War, Liberalism, and Modernity:  The Biopolitical Provocations of 
‘Empire’”, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, (Vol. 17, No. 1, April 2004, pg. 
63-78), 65.   
8 Theodore Koditschek, Liberalism, Imperialism and the Historical Imagination: 
Nineteenth-Century Visions of a Greater Britain, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), and Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in 
Britain and France, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005).   
9 Pitts, A Turn To Empire, 4.   
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equality, due to the unfortunately violent means through which it has sought to achieve 
them.  The problem with this argument is that it treats the liberal commitment to peace as 
a “rhetorical device” that disguises ulterior, materially driven agendas.10  This ultimately 
reinforces the widely held belief that liberalism can serve the best interests of humanity if 
its engagement with violence is reduced to a minimum.   
Uday Singh Mehta’s groundbreaking work Liberalism and Empire, on the other 
hand, rejects the question of there being a gap between liberal thought and practice, and 
instead suggests that the “inclusionary pretentions” of liberalism correlate directly to the 
“exclusionary effects” of its practices.11  “More specifically,” states Singh Mehta,  
one must consider whether the exclusionary thrust of liberal history stems from 
the misapprehension of the generative basis of liberal universalism or whether, in 
contrast, liberal history projects with greater focus and onto a larger canvas the 
theoretically veiled and qualified truth of liberal universalism.12   
 
Singh Mehta’s analysis provides a more critical perspective.  It remains necessary, 
though, to trace the development of liberal regimes back, as Reid suggests  
to the origins of their emergence in the 18th century and the development of the 
techniques with which they first set out to posit a solution to the problem of war 
through the pacification of life and the imposition of liberal accounts of humanity 
within their own and other societies.13   
This paradox, in other words, does not simply exist on the surface of liberalism, 
but lies at the heart of liberal modernity.14  Modernity is a complex topic that refers to a 
diverse set of political, economic, and cultural circumstances.  Its liberal component, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Julian Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: Life Struggles, Liberal Modernity, 
and the Defence of Logistical Societies, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2006), 5. 
11 Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British 
Liberal Thought, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 46. 
12 Ibid.   
13 Reid, The Biopolitics of the War on Terror, 6.  	  
14 Ibid. 
	   5	  
though, can be identified as the moment when, plagued by ongoing conflict, European 
regimes sought to remove life from the conditions of war.15  Although this juncture is 
difficult to locate, historian Michael Howard suggests that the growth of the “liberal 
conscience” occurred from 1500 to 1792.  Specifically, Howard states, “it is from the end 
of the Napoleonic Wars that one can date the beginning of what was to become known as 
‘the Peace Movement’; that is, the political organization of middle-class liberals on a 
transnational basis to secure…the abolition of war.16  It was in 1795, furthermore, when 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant famously claimed that a new liberal era would fulfill 
the universal human destiny toward “perpetual peace.”17  This project was indeed 
embraced in a variety of dynamic ways across time and space.  In Britain, it was 
manifested as a philosophy, a partisan movement, and a set of policies.18  From 
approximately 1830 to 1850, liberal ideas began to dominate politics in Britain.  This was 
best represented in 1846 when the Corn Laws were repealed by the Conservative 
government of Robert Peel, who also legislated several other reforms said to push Britain 
in the direction of a stable, prosperous democracy.19  As Hannah Arendt notes, “citizens 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the 
History of Relations Between States, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 1.   
16 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981), 13, 36.   
17 Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”, in Pauline 
Kleingeld (ed.) and David L. Colclasure (trans.), Toward Perpetual Peace and Other 
Writings on Politics, Peace, and History, (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2006), 67.   
18 W.C. Lubenow, “Mediating ‘the Chaos of Incident’ and ‘the Cosmos of Sentiment’: 
Liberalism in Britain, 1815-1914,” in The Journal of British Studies, (Vol. 10, No. 3, 
2008, 492-504), 493.   
19 Roy Jenkins, The British Liberal Tradition: From Gladstone to Young Churchill, 
Asquith, and Lloyd George – Is Blair Their Heir?, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2001), 16-17.   
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with opinions about, and interests in the handling of public affairs” constituted the 
organizational means for liberalism in countries such as Britain.20   
However, for the purpose of this thesis, the emergence of Britain as a liberal 
regime is better understood as a ‘process,’ rather than an isolated event, that was 
inseparable from the experience of its “imperial century.”21  The intellectual arguments 
for colonial rule by those nineteenth century liberals who shared an aspiration for peace 
show that the advent of liberal modernity multiplied the reasons to use force by 
expanding the criteria that defined the non-liberal ‘other.’  The violent tendencies of 
liberal regimes, this sense, do not deviate from their stated ideals, but are instead 
productive of the conditions called for to advance the supposedly degenerate forms 
human life that exist outside the orbit of ‘civilization,’ and render them compatible with 
the demand to live peacefully.  The process of creating of liberal subjects, then, whether 
via the contemporary War on Terror, or the violence wrought by the British Empire in the 
nineteenth century, amounts to a struggle to dictate the political constitution of life itself.  
Thus, although the British conquest and rule of India cannot be isolated from the entire 
history of colonialism that was destructive every moment of the day for hundreds of 
years, it can be said to have exhibited a peculiar form of violence informed by the liberal 
conceptualization of what it means to be human. 
I seek to show how colonialism was formative to the liberal project by employing 
the concept of biopolitics as developed by Michel Foucault.  In The History of Sexuality 
Vol. 1. Foucault explains that biopolitics emerged in eighteenth century Europe when the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Totalitarian regimes, in contrast, command and rely on mass support, Hanna Arendt, 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt Inc., 1968), 306-307, 308. 
21 Timothy Parsons, The British Imperial Century, 1815-1914, (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 1.    
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sovereign right to deprive a populace or dispose of it outright was replaced by “a power 
bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one 
dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them.”22  But the 
emergence of a form of power that attempts to exert control over life does not lead to 
peace, but to the intensification of violence that targets life’s aleatory – or random – 
features.23  As he states with reference to the mass barbarism of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries: 
Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they 
are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are 
mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: 
massacres have become vital.  It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and 
the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars.24   
 
Foucault elaborates on biopolitics in a series of lectures titled Security, Territory, 
Population.  In these lectures, Foucault explains that as the natural phenomena that 
constitute populations, such as birth and death rates, health status, and life span, gradually 
became the referent object of knowledge and power, liberal regimes historically devised 
technologies of security to protect human life and oversee its development.25  “For the 
first time in history,” wrote Foucault, “biological existence was reflected in political 
existence.”26 
In contrast to the government of individual subjects, whose obedience to the law 
could be enforced through disciplinary tactics, population, understood as a social body, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1:  An Introduction, Robert Hurley 
(trans), (New York:  Random House, 1978), 136.   
23 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1977-1978, Michel Senellart (ed), Graham Burchell (trans), (Hampshire and New York:  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 137.   
24 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 136.   
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 142.   
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had to be normalized in order to prevent and compensate for the risks and dangers 
inherent to the survival of biological life.27  The government of population, in other 
words, seeks to produce unfettered subjects suited to furthering the productive capacities 
of the human species.  In order to optimize human life, biopolitical regimes constantly 
adjudicate, and if necessary, apply lethal force to forms of life that are perceived as unfit 
to the enhancement of human capabilities.  Biopolitics, then, while concerned with the 
promotion of life, is simultaneously a politics of death.28 
In another lecture series titled Society Must Be Defended, Foucault states that 
“racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide.”29  
This is important because, as Stephen Morton notes, “it raises a question about the extent 
to which Foucault’s model of biopolitical power can account for the political foundation 
of the European colony.”30  Although this passage of his work is often overlooked, as 
Foucault himself did not develop a systematic analysis of imperialism, the link between 
biopolitics and colonialism has been developed in other important works.31  In Race and 
the Education of Desire:  Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of 
Things, Ann Laura Stoler problematizes Foucault’s ‘genealogy’ of racism in relation to 
the history of colonialism.  Stoler is sympathetic to Foucault’s argument in the History of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Thomas Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction, (New York: New York 
University Press, 2011) 36, 37. 
28 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”:  Lectures at the Collège de France 
1975-1976, Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (eds), David Macy (trans),  (New 
York:  Picador, 2003). 
29 Ibid., 257.  	  
30 Stephen Morton, “Torture, Terrorism and Colonial Sovereignty”, in Stephen Morton 
and Stephen Bygrave, eds. Foucault in an Age of Terror:  Essays on Biopolitics and the 
Defence of Society, (Hampshire:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 183.   
31 Thomas Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction. 
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Sexuality that “the affirmation of the bourgeois self was secured through specific 
technologies centered on sexuality.”32  She extends his analysis by saying that the 
discursive incitement to speak about sexuality that produced the self-regulating norms of 
modern society were not limited to Europe, but existed in imperial relations between the 
European, bourgeois ‘Self,’ and the sexualized ‘Other.’33  According to Stoler, it is 
possible to see that race, as well as sexuality, played a normalizing role that is 
particularly evident in imperial projects with the deployment of a racialized discourse of 
“internal enemies” that threaten biopoliticized life.34  
In his essay “Necropolitics,” Achille Mbembe argues that the function of 
biopolitics to determine who can live and who must die is the ultimate expression of 
political sovereignty.  Mbembe extends Foucault’s analysis by relating biopolitics to the 
‘state of exception,’ or the continuous appeal to emergency and “fictionalized notion of 
the enemy.”35  The state of exception stands outside the rule of law, and uses the 
biopolitical logic of racism to regulate the distribution of death.  According to Mbembe, 
“race has been the ever-present shadow in Western political thought and practice, 
especially when it comes to imagining the inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples.”36  
While Foucault stated that biopolitics reached its most violent expression in the state 
racism of Nazi Germany, Mbembe points out that such violence was also inherent to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
and the Colonial Order of Things, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), 
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33 Ibid., 3, 91, 92.   
34 Ibid., 92, 93.   
35 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics”, in Stephen Morton and Stephen Bygrave (eds), 
Foucault in an Age of Terror:  Essays on Biopolitics and the Defence of Society, 
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European imperialism.  Mbembe notes that there is no legal basis for colonial warfare – it 
is not subject to any institutional rules.  The only ‘rule’ involved is the notion that the life 
of the species depends on the correction, exclusion, or death of the ‘inferior’ racialized 
‘Other.’37 
Indeed, as Paul Gilroy notes, “a fuller appreciation of specifically colonial input 
into modern statecraft promises an altogether different sense of where biopolitical 
procedures and anthropological hierarchies might fit into an amended history of 
modernity.”38  Although contemporary political scientists invoke history as a necessary 
means to understand the paradox of liberal modernity, claiming that it was in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that “liberal regimes first discovered the means by 
which to seize and manipulate the life of their societies in hitherto unprecedented ways,” 
their work is only cursorily historical.39  This paradox therefore demands a precise 
historical investigation that examines the link between violence and distinctively liberal 
accounts of humanity.  This is necessary to understand how liberalism – the most 
hegemonic system of our time – was shaped alongside the expansion of its frontier.   
I aim to demonstrate the validity of Foucault’s theory of modernity by looking at 
how liberal thinkers conceptualized and legitimated colonial rule.  In doing so, it 
becomes evident that British rule in India was essentially a biopolitical project in which 
the promotion of life could not be separated from the construction of liberal political 
economy.  The subjugation of Indian society to the commercial dynamics of capitalism 
was seen as a means to increase the innovative capacities of human life in a world 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid., 163. 
38 Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or convivial culture, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2004), 48.   
39 Reid, Biopolitics of War on Terror, x, 6.   
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defined by expanding industry.  When Indian society resisted conformity to liberal 
political economy, it was met with exclusion, or in the case of the vengeful repression of 
the mutiny-rebellion of 1857, mass destruction.  The case of India is by no means unique 
within the history of European imperialism, and several other equally atrocious examples 
of colonial violence can be drawn from its diverse history.40  It was, however, the ‘jewel 
in the crown’ of the British Empire, and therefore serves as an appealing site for this 
study.  More importantly, the application of such theory helps to explain how colonial 
violence in India operated in tandem with the apparent concern for human life, and the 
economic conditions supposedly needed to insure its proliferation – a historical problem 
for which existing literature has failed to account for adequately.  That is not to say that 
there does not exist very important works in the historiography of colonial India.  Ranajit 
Guha, Edward Said, Bernard Cohn, and Nicholas Dirks all wrote within a context 
dominated by questions concerning land, race, and knowledge, and thus provide an ideal 
basis for the reading of this colonial discourse.   
Guha’s A Rule of Property for Bengal:  An Essay on the Idea of Permanent 
Settlement examines the EIC’s goal to impose Western political economy on Indian 
peasants in order to foster capitalist agriculture.41  Guha focuses on the role of private 
property – as derived from classical political economists during the eighteenth century – 
and how it served as a means to organize and govern Indian society.42  Guha’s work was 
one of the first to address the experience of colonization from the Indian perspective.  
While acknowledging the role of the British and their colonization of India, Guha 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Paul Gilroy, After Empire, 50.   
41 Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent 
Settlement, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996). 
42 Ibid., 8.	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challenges Western conceptions of modernity by showing that the principles of liberal 
political economy are not ‘universal.’  The imposition of Western economic practices on 
colonial subjects harmed a society that already had its own history and forms of social 
organization.43  Guha’s work is essential, not only for demonstrating the processes of 
exploitation inherent to British imperialism for the expansion of capitalism in India, but 
also for acknowledging the history, culture, and knowledge of ‘subaltern’ groups. While 
Guha is informed by the Marxist tradition, his work is also an essential text in 
postcolonialism, a field for which Said’s Orientalism is a founding work.   
In Orientalism Said discusses the cultural construction of difference between the 
European ‘Self’ and the non-European ‘Other.’  Said argues that the ‘Orient’ was a 
European invention that Europeans used to define themselves as ‘civilized.’44  According 
to Said, colonial power did not simply operate through military and political domination, 
but also through the production of knowledge about the colonized ‘Other.’  Colonized 
populations – their racial differences, cultural expressions, forms of social and political 
organization, and interaction with the space they inhabit – became the object of a colonial 
knowledge, which in turn reproduced perceived notions of difference and ‘inferiority’ 
that served to rationalize colonial subjugation.  This perspective highlights the close 
relationship between knowledge and power that Foucault stressed, and the process 
through which power creates ‘truth’ in order to legitimate itself.  As Said notes, the ‘true’ 
knowledge of the colonized as ‘uncivilized’ and ‘traditional’ justified the colonial project 
because it was created through modern ‘scientific’ rationality.45  This led to the belief that 
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colonization was not political.  It did not, in other words, benefit Europeans at the 
expense of the ‘Other,’ but instead became Europeans’ moral obligation for the sake of 
colonized peoples’ ‘improvement.’46  
Dirks’s Castes of Mind and Cohn’s Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge 
make similar arguments about how colonialism depended on and produced new forms of 
knowledge.  Cohn, for example, argues that the British maintained dominance in India 
through the dissemination of what were perceived to be facts about India’s past – its 
ancient cultures and political developments.  This informed a teleological view of Indian 
history that culminated with the arrival of modernity.47  Cohn also explains how 
anthropological evidence of Indian society was generated through mechanisms such as 
the census.48  The Indian census, conducted in the late nineteenth century, reinforced 
social categories that the British assumed represented basic sociological facts.  This 
deepened their justification for divisive colonial rule.49  Cohn’s work also highlights how 
India served as an experimental space for the creation and testing of governmental 
strategies.50  This is important because it reveals how colonialism consolidated the power 
of the modern nation-state. 
Building on these works I will analyze the writings of James Wilson – the founder 
and long-term editor the Economist newspaper from 1843-1860, which was the 
prototypical liberal publication on nineteenth-century political economy.  Wilson became 
a member of the British House of Commons in 1847, and acquired his first ministerial job 	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(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1996).   
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49 Ibid.    
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in 1848 at the India Board of Control.51  The writings of Wilson provide insight into how 
a certain sector of British capitalists thought about India, and their moral justification for 
its colonization.  In this respect, the work of political economist and philosopher John 
Stuart Mill is also of crucial importance.  Mill, whose father James wrote the famous 
History of British India, like his father, held office in the India Board of Control from 
1823 to 1858 and wrote about Indian society and British colonial rule.  His social and 
political writings on colonial rule provide further insight into how the British perceived 
India, and emphasized the need for ‘progress’ through the installment of liberal 
capitalism.52  Mill’s successor as secretary of the political and secret department of the 
India Office, John William Kaye, also wrote extensively on British rule in India.  His 
books The Administration of the East India Company: A History of Indian Progress, and 
History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8 are essential works in this colonial discourse.  
Additionally, the work of Sir George Campbell – the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal 
from 1871 to 1874 – provides crucial insight into how the British perceived and 
constructed racial difference in India during the aftermath of the mutiny-rebellion.  
It has been sufficiently documented that British political and economic thought 
was an important factor that shaped the mental attitudes of colonial policy makers in 
nineteenth century India – especially so considering the cultural significance and impact 
of the Economist.53  In fact, many administrators in India had knowledge of classical 
political economy, most importantly the arguments of Adam Smith, J.S. Mill, and 	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Thomas Robert Malthus.  The court of directors even went as far as to incorporate a study 
of these ‘immutable laws of society and economy’ into the training of officials who were 
to rule in India, and to likewise arm ordinary civil servants with such knowledge.54  
However, my intention is not to elaborate on how British intellectual thought influenced 
colonial policies in India.  Regardless of the value that political economy had in the 
formulation of policies, my aim is to show how the works of these liberal writers justified 
attempts to reorganize Indian society.  Although they address the role of the British, the 
peasantry, race, labour, and the expansion of capital in their own way, they all share an 
apparent commitment to human dignity, freedom, the rule of law, and representative 
government.55  Their writings converge, ultimately, to reveal the tension between 
violence and progress that was inherent to colonial rule in India.  By subjecting this 
discourse to a biopolitical critique, it becomes evident that, although Indian 
administrators indeed accepted the ideologies of political economists, the rule of liberal 
political economy in India was bound up with the emerging category of ‘life’, which, 
according to Foucault, formed the basis for the exercise of modern power.56  It is through 
Foucault, in other words, that analysis can move beyond an understanding of liberal 
colonialism as simply an instrument for the “material aggrandizement” of empire, and 
instead view it as a means to pacify the various forms of life that liberalism perceived as 
threatening to its universal claim to liberate humanity.57  
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The first chapter of this thesis further develops the theoretical framework put 
forward here.  It explains the difference between the classical political economic thought 
of Adam Smith in the late eighteenth century, and that of the mid nineteenth century.  
This era of the Enlightenment experienced a transition that was influenced by what I term 
the ‘moral sentiments.’  The demand to live peacefully that was expressed by liberal 
economic thinkers in the late eighteenth century, I argue, gave rise to the universalism of 
nineteenth century liberalism.  As such, non-liberal societies such as India were targeted 
for colonial intervention.  This is evident in the writings of J.S. Mill and the Economist, 
both of which disparaged India, and although sensitive to European motives for peace, 
stressed the coercive rule over the ‘backward’ subjects of India.  Here I will elaborate on 
the thought of Foucault in greater detail, and explain how it was precisely the pursuit of 
liberal peace in Europe that demanded the biopolitical assault on Indian society.   
Chapter two discusses the changes that occurred as the EIC fostered capitalist 
agriculture and introduced the technological components of liberal political economy in 
India.  The writings of the Economist, J.S. Mill, and John William Kaye will be taken up 
and analyzed in terms of their opinions on peasants, and how political economy was seen 
as the only vehicle to improve their existence.  Here I will address the problems 
associated with the liberal arguments about the development of capitalism.  According to 
political economists from the eighteenth century onward, the development of capitalism 
was a ‘natural’ stage in the progress of humanity, which added to the justification for the 
exploitation of Indian peasants.  However, evidence shows that the rise of capitalism in 
Britain and India was process of, as David Harvey terms it, “accumulation by 
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dispossession.”58  The dispossession of peasants from their land was necessary not only 
as a means to induce them to labour, but also to transform them into liberal subjects who 
could enjoy a newfound ‘self-interest.’  The main argument in this chapter is that the 
liberal subject of political economy was seen as ideally suited to reproducing liberal 
forms of life.  The construction of political economy in India thus reveals the biopolitics 
of liberal colonialism.   
Chapter three examines the Indian mutiny-rebellion of 1857.  It argues, first of all, 
that the uprising symbolized resistance to the liberal account of humanity imposed British 
authority.  Here I will examine the writings of the Economist and George Campbell in 
significant detail.  In these writings it becomes apparent that with the 1857 mutiny-
rebellion, the perceived ability to adapt to liberal forms of life became intertwined with 
race.  It was at this point, in other words, that race and political economy became 
indistinguishable in the liberal colonial discourse of the British.  While the British 
repressed the revolt, they were able to enhance their understanding of biopoliticized life 
according to the racialized hierarchy that formed the basis of colonial sovereignty.  
This thesis concludes that the biopolitics of modern liberal regimes did not 
develop independently of their colonial relationships.  The moral sentiments expressed by 
Adam Smith and other classical political economists reoriented the juridical power of the 
British state toward peace, but motivated, paradoxically, the intervention into societies 
said to exist beyond the boundaries of liberal rule.  An analysis of colonial India, as read 
through the nineteenth century discourse on progress, demonstrates that the British 
preoccupation with race, knowledge, and classification contributed to their understanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 David Harvey, The New Imperialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 143,  
	   18	  
of humans as part of a biological species, and the emergence, therefore, of biopolitics.  
These biopolitical strategies of power were not limited to the colonial setting.  Nor were 
they simply exported from Europe to its colonial peripheries.  India, rather, served as a 
“laboratory of modernity” – a testing ground in which the subjugation of life to 
governmental controls was practiced.59  In fact, the modern process of state building in 
Britain was closely linked to its rise as an imperial power in the nineteenth century.60  Far 
from being an accomplishment, the liberal biopolitics that developed within this 
continuum constituted an assault on the indeterminacy of life. 
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THE ‘MORAL SENTIMENTS’:  LIBERAL PEACE, BIOPOLITICS, AND THE 
THREAT OF ‘ORIENTAL DESPOTISM’ 
“There is no liberalism without a culture of danger.” – Michel Foucault 
This chapter builds on the theoretical framework put forward in the introduction 
by discussing the historical link between motives for liberal peace in the eighteenth 
century, and the consolidation of British imperialism and colonial rule in the nineteenth 
century.  This link is necessary in order to understand how two seemingly contradictory 
processes merged to produce liberal colonialism in India.  The pursuit to secure the 
welfare of modern societies was born out of the intellectual arguments of the 
Enlightenment.  Of particular importance was the thought of the Scottish classical 
political economist Adam Smith, who argued that economic freedom is what enabled 
individuals to peacefully coexist.  This period produced what I term the ‘moral 
sentiments,’ which defined the proliferation of imperial aggression and violence in the 
nineteenth century.  After having presented the arguments of Smith, this chapter returns 
to Foucault’s analysis and critique of the methods used to pacify modern societies, which 
differs significantly from the formula described by the Scottish Enlightenment.  This 
discussion of Foucault’s thought is necessary, not only as a step in tracing the paradox of 
liberal modernity to its origins in the eighteenth century, but also to develop a more 
detailed explanation of the biopolitical foundations of liberalism.  With Foucault’s 
interpretation in mind, it becomes more clear how nineteenth century liberals, who, 
although influenced by Smith and informed by the desire for peace, justified the alien 
rule of the British over Indian subjects.  It is through the help of Foucault, in other words, 
that the liberal support for violence and imperialism appears as a direct consequence of 
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how liberalism originally sought to order society according to a biopolitical account of 
humanity.   
This argument is supported by the thought John Stuart Mill and the Economist, as 
well as the liberal tradition broadly conceived in the nineteenth century.  An essential 
aspect of their disparaging attitudes toward India was the apparent lack of a commercial 
system involving private property and wage labour.  While the influence of Smith is clear 
in their writings, both J.S. Mill and the Economist extend the ‘proper’ organization of 
society to Britain’s colonial frontier.  Through an analysis of their writings on political 
economy and India, I argue that British rule in India sought to ‘pacify’ non-liberal forms 
of life, and incorporate them into a universal vision of progress.  In order to complete the 
theoretical framework from which this thesis proceeds, this chapter concludes by further 
explaining the unique character of liberal colonialism – as derived from the 
preoccupations of J.S. Mill and the Economist.  It was the universalism at the core of 
their ideology that speaks to Britain’s ‘civilizing mission’, which sought to improve the 
life of Indian subjects, and protect modern society from the peril of their ‘traditional’ 
customs.   
According to Immanuel Kant, it was the state of continuous conflict experienced 
in Europe during the early modern period that “stimulated a desire to escape from a 
condition of perpetual bloodshed.”61  This desire to realize a moral revolution was 
expressed by numerous liberal thinkers in the eighteenth century.  Central to the pursuit 
of liberal peace was the drive to liberate the “commercial spirit,” which, wrote Kant, 
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“cannot co-exist with war.”62  While Kant is recognized for his personal contribution to 
modern political thought, he shares similarities with the tradition of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, which also linked peace to the facilitation of commerce and free trade.  
The Scottish Enlightenment was an intellectual movement that lasted most of the 
eighteenth century, and whose particular focus on economics had significant 
reverberations throughout the world.  Adam Smith was amongst its foremost figures and 
advocates for governmental reform.  According to Smith, the restrictive powers of 
centralized monarchies debased the entrepreneurial ability of human beings.  As he states 
in his famous treatise on political economy The Wealth of Nations:  “To prohibit a great 
people…from making all that they can of every part of their own produce, or from 
employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to 
themselves, is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind.”63  In contrast, 
the facilitation of commerce amongst free individuals increased the general welfare of 
society.64   
In The Wealth of Nations Smith lays out his ideal vision of “commercial society.”  
Arguing against the dominant mercantilist system of the time, which promoted the ability 
to monopolize markets, thereby restricting other individuals’ economic interests, Smith 
instead believed that society was best served by removing governmental barriers to allow 
individual actors to pursue their own improvement.65  According to Smith, in such a 
situation, there appears an “invisible hand” that balances the wealth of society, based on 	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the human urge to create order and progress.66  This “system of natural liberty,” as Smith 
termed it, is achievable only through private property and wage labour – the tenets that 
form laissez-faire capitalism.  As Smith states:  “The property which every man has in his 
own labour…is the most sacred and inviolable.”67  Furthermore, when “all systems, 
either of preference or of restraint,” are “completely taken away, the obvious and simple 
system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord.”68  Although individuals are 
encouraged to compete against each other under this system, the result is to the benefit of 
the public interest.  At the time of writing The Wealth of Nations, Smith believed that the 
actions of the “invisible hand” made the pursuit of self-interest favourable to Britain’s 
economic growth through the creation and distribution of wealth. 
The classical political economy of Smith was an important contribution to liberal 
ideology in the eighteenth century, or as I term it, the ‘moral sentiments.’  This is not to 
be confused with Smith’s earlier work titled The Theory of Moral Sentiments, but rather 
refers to a general concept that defines the attempt to free the innovative capacities of 
individuals from autocratic rule, and establish the economic linkages that were to act as 
the unifying force of liberal modernity.69  Indeed, Smith makes altogether different 
arguments in The Wealth of Nations than he does in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  In 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, for example, Smith addresses the ethical foundations of 
human society in the philosophical realm.  Smith’s main argument is that human actions 
are guided by natural instincts.  These instincts, such as the desire to promote personal 
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well-being, and the well-being of others, help to create social harmony as individuals 
develop a moral conscience.70  Although Smith does not address the economic realm in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he does criticize the destructive power of autocratic 
rule.  The focus, though, is far more on the virtues of “benevolence” in the creation of a 
just society.  By employing benevolence, “the wise and virtuous man,” writes Smith, “ is 
at all times willing that his own private interest should be sacrificed to the public interest 
of his own particular order or society.”71  The Wealth of Nations, in contrast, emphasizes 
the importance of self-interest in this regard.  In Smith’s later view, 
Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for 
him to expect it from their benevolence only…It is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their 
regard to their own interest…Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly 
upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.72 
 
Although Smith makes different arguments in these works, the spirit of his work 
combined – from his thought in moral philosophy to political economy – speaks to the 
motives of liberal peace.  As he states:   
The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I 
am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy.  But the 
mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit, of merchants and manufacturers, who 
neither are, nor ought to be the rulers of mankind, though it cannot perhaps be 
corrected, may very easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquility of 
anybody but themselves.73 
 
Importantly, as Smith came to identify absolute power with the ability to restrict 
individuals economically through monopolies, his formula for commercial society 	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centered on liberal capitalism.  If not directly concerned with the elimination of violence 
in society, Smith was at least arguing for the reform necessary to guarantee the right for 
individuals to engage in commerce, which “ought naturally to be, among nations, as 
among individuals, a bond of union and friendship.”74  Smith’s ideas were certainly 
influential in promoting concepts of economic liberalism, which began to dominate 
British economic and political thought in the early nineteenth century.75  By the 1840s, 
for example, the ‘science’ of political economy articulated by Smith was being 
championed by the Economist.  Adhering staunchly to Smith’s classical liberal 
arguments, the paper encouraged free trade in agricultural goods in Britain, and 
rigorously opposed the Corn Laws.76  Importantly, this formula for the correct 
organization of society, which centered on permitting the ‘natural’ functions of the 
market, was also given an imperial dimension, as it increasingly became the basis on 
which nineteenth century liberals rationalized Britain’s rule over foreign subjects.77  It is 
in this sense that Smith’s work was an integral aspect of the ‘moral sentiments’ that 
informed the British Empire’s attempt to right the world according to the principles of 
liberal political economy.    
The pacification of Western societies also plays a key role in Foucault’s critique 
of liberal modernity.  According to Foucault, the process by which regimes attempted to 
institute sustained peace through the development of a ‘moral community’ began in 
England, and was enabled by modern military science.  In the middle Ages, the English 
nobility was an extremely militarized and predatory class.  It was distinguished from its 	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European counterparts by its constant external aggression.  Such campaigns were not 
carried out by a professional army, but rather relied on indentured companies that owed 
allegiance to the monarchy.78  The popular demands of the English Revolution, though, 
led to the gradual modernization of society.  In Discipline and Punish, notes Julian Reid, 
Foucault challenges the traditional rationality of military science, which he argues, 
resides not simply in the ends toward which military force is ultimately deployed, but 
also, if not more importantly, the nature of military organization itself, which, by the time 
of the Commonwealth period in England, served as an ideal framework for the social 
organization of society.79  What distinguishes modern military organization, argues 
Foucault, is the emergence of a range of various “disciplinary” techniques such as 
enclosure, partitioning, ranking and serialization.80  As Foucault states:  
By the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be 
made:  out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be 
constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly 
through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, 
turning silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has ‘got rid of the 
peasant’ and given him ‘the air of the soldier.81   
 
Although such techniques originated in the military as a means with which to 
control mass armies, they were gradually adjusted and applied, argues Foucault, to 
societies as a whole.82  As such:  “In the great 18th century states, the army guaranteed 
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civil peace no doubt because it was a real force, an ever threatening sword, but also 
because it was a technique and a body of knowledge that could project their schema over 
the social body.”83  The object of this new disciplinary power was the individuated body, 
whose subjection was made possible by the physiological knowledge generated in the 
military sciences.84   Discipline and Punish shows how liberal peace operates by 
establishing “uniform docility among individualized bodies.”85 
This was made possible through the alliance between the military and life 
sciences, which, “in constituting the natural body as the object of disciplinary 
power…also began to conceive of populations themselves as species bodies defined by a 
common genesis, evolutionary patterns and survival rates.”86  With industrialization, 
modern regimes were confronted with a host of new problems surrounding population 
such as birthrate, longevity, and public health.  Disciplinary power, then, was 
accompanied by “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the 
subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of 
biopower.”87  The ability to segment and divide society gave way to the ability to 
normalize the population.  Biopower did not displace disciplinary power altogether, but 
developed alongside disciplinary power’s engagement with the life sciences.  As Foucault 
puts it:   
Power over life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical, 
however; they constituted rather two poles of development linked together by a 
whole intermediary cluster of relations.  One of these poles – the first to be 
formed, it seems – centered on the body as a machine; its disciplining, the 	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optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of 
its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and 
economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that 
characterized the disciplines:  an anatomo-politics of the human body.  The 
second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued 
with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes:  
propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and 
longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.  Their supervision 
was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls:  a 
biopolitics of the population.  The disciplines of the body and the regulations of 
the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power 
over life was deployed.88 
 
According to Foucault, this power over life was essential to the development of 
“capitalism… [which] would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of 
bodies into the machinery of production.”89  The excision of ‘the peasant’ was quite 
literal during the expansion of Britain’s rural capitalist sector in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  The enclosure of common land during this period was meant to 
induce peasants to labour.90  However, with the development of disciplinary techniques, 
power was no longer based on the sovereign’s exploitation of bodies for their surpluses.  
Rather, as the “right of seizure,” was replaced by the power to “make live”, its aim was to 
“assure and regulate the correct procedure by which the body carries out its labour as an 
end in itself.”91  In this schema, life itself becomes an instrument in the expansion of 
productive forces.  In this sense, everyone becomes ‘a soldier,’ mobilized in defense of 
the conditions that secure the peaceful existence of humanity.     	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The processes of liberal peace were accelerated by the collapse of the old regime 
in Europe.  With the rise of the Commonwealth in Britain, and republicanism in France – 
which served as a model for the political transformation of Western states – the liberal 
project to secure the biological existence of humanity emerged.  Writing in 1791, the 
famous liberal thinker Thomas Paine stated that:  “As the barbarism of the present old 
governments expires, the moral condition of nations with respect to each other will be 
changed.  Man will not be brought up with the savage idea of considering his species as 
his enemy.”92  But contrary to Paine’s optimism, the prioritization of ‘life’ produced 
irreconcilable antagonisms between liberal rule and its subjects.  “The paradox of this 
early enunciation of liberalism” notes political scientist Michael Dillon, “was not that it 
brought an end to war, but that it multiplied the reasons for making war.”93  Despite the 
enormous influence of liberal thought, modernity has nonetheless been defined by the 
proliferation of war and violence.  The reason the ‘moral sentiments’ were not able to 
reconcile this problem was because they led to an increasingly narrow sense of what it 
meant to live peacefully.  As this thesis will demonstrate, liberal regimes became intent 
on eliminating elements of human existence, both within and beyond their societies that 
were identified as threats to the construction of peace.  The ‘moral sentiments’ served to 
limit the grounds for war, but the demand to live according to the system of natural 
liberty made the violence of liberal regimes a necessity – universalizing force in order to 
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pursue the international stability required for individual liberty to prosper.94  The 
fundamental difference, as Reid points out, is that “traditionally, war functioned as a 
means of resolving disputes between sovereigns whose power was based on a 
fundamental disjuncture between themselves and their subjects.”95  In a biopolitical 
context, however, war was instead made in defense and promotion of human populations.  
As Foucault clarifies:    
The existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at 
stake is the biological existence of a population.  If genocide is indeed the dream 
of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; 
it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the 
race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.96   
 
While the intensity of violence certainly continued to increase within modern 
Europe – culminating in the atrocities of the first and second world wars – the 
fundamental principles that guided liberal warfare were also present in the violence 
inherent to British imperialism and colonial rule in India.  Again, the importance of this 
argument does not lie specifically in the phenomenon of war, but rather in the fact that 
liberal regimes are prone to violence.  With that said, there is very little distinction 
between the liberal justification for armed conflict, and the colonization of non-Western 
peoples.  In this sense, British rule in India should be seen as a warlike enterprise.  In 
imperialism, though, the conflict does not occur on a ‘field’ in the usual sense of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Brian Bond notes that between 1837 and 1900, Britain engaged in seventy four military 
interventions, Brian Bond, Victorian Military Campaigns, (New York and Washington: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 309-311.   
95 Reid, Life Struggles, 24.   
96 Foucault, The History of Sexuality.  
	   30	  
term, but rather exists as a means of distinguishing ‘friend’ from ‘enemy,’ and is derived 
directly from the unique manner in which liberalism construes peace.97   
 Just as Smith and other liberal thinkers in the eighteenth century argued against 
mercantilism – the system of state intervention into the economy – they were equally 
critical of colonialism.  With reference to the colonization of the Americas, for example, 
Smith states:   
Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over and 
directed the first project of establishing those colonies; the folly of hunting after 
gold and silver mines, the injustice of coveting the possession of a country whose 
harmless natives, far from having ever injured the people of Europe, had received 
the first adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospitality…Upon all these 
different occasions it was, not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and 
injustice of the European governments, which peopled and cultivated America.98 
 
In their view, Europeans were in no position to disseminate their culture or institutions 
through colonialism.  This was a view articulated by thinkers who had already 
experienced the injustice of autocratic rule within Europe, and saw the mistake of 
exporting it to other regions of the world.99  The imperialism of the EIC and its 
mercantilist policies thus represented an arbitrary authority.100  However, although 
contested by eighteenth century liberals, the justification for colonial rule was renewed in 
the nineteenth century.  The contrast between eighteenth century liberals and their 
successors in the nineteenth century was the fact that their sense of cultural superiority 
increased dramatically.  The liberal “turn to empire” experienced in this period was 
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accompanied by the development of “more contemptuous notions of backwardness and a 
cruder dichotomy between barbarity and civilization.”101 
 J.S. Mill was a prominent thinker amongst this generation of liberals.  Throughout 
his career, he displayed support for the colonial governments in Ireland and India, and 
served as an official in the EIC’s Board of Control from 1822 to 1856.  Like Smith, J.S. 
Mill was not outwardly concerned with the problem of war, but was nonetheless sensitive 
to the liberal cause for peace.  For example, J.S. Mill noted that the influence of 
liberalism on European society had served to better protect individuals against the 
“violence and rapacity of one another,” and the “arbitrary exercise of the power of 
government.”102  For Mill, the progress of civilized society is characterized by the 
increase of “security,” which allows for the pursuit of material prosperity, thus 
eliminating the need for violence.103  However, although J.S. Mill was informed by this 
formula for liberal peace, the increase of cultural superiority is evident in his thought.  
J.S. Mill disparaged the “barbarism” of Native Americans and “Negros.”  Slavery, 
though, was for J.S. Mill, a detestable institution because it did not lead to any 
improvement of human capabilities.  It does not provide, as liberalism does, for the 
overall progress of modern society.   
J.S. Mill was certainly influenced by his father, James Mill, and both were 
members of the so-called ‘utilitarian’ school of philosophy.  James Mill, with his History 
of British India, initiated a legitimizing discourse about Britain’s role as a ‘civilizing’ 
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force in India that his son helped to carry forward.104  Although J.S. Mill did not write 
about India as extensively as his father did, his “encounter” with India framed his ideas 
on political economy, which were also directly influenced by Adam Smith.105  His 
Principles of Political Economy was published in 1848, and used examples from India 
and Ireland to serve his arguments about how rural populations should progress under the 
correct system of proprietorship.  The progress of India was to rely on the creation of a 
prosperous and independent class of farmers.  J.S. Mill’s concern to lift ‘backward’ 
subjects out of poverty, though, depended on the violent rule of the EIC.  Furthermore, 
Mill recognized that war, by the mid nineteenth century, was confined to “those distant 
and outlying possessions at which it comes into contact with savages.”106  In such cases, 
despotic rule over colonial subjects was legitimate, provided the end is their 
improvement.107 
 Similarly, James Wilson, the founder and editor of the Economist, was a disciple 
of Smith’s doctrine that public good is served best when individuals are free to look after 
themselves, since government interference upsets the creation of wealth.108  Like J.S. 
Mill, Wilson was involved in the administration of India, serving in the India Board of 
Control – the department tasked to supervise the activities of the East India Company – 
from 1848 to 1852.  Wilson’s support for colonial rule in India is evident in the 
Economist, which, beginning in the 1840s, wrote extensively on the necessity of fostering 
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a liberal order and economy in India.  The paper, like liberal rule itself, ostensibly 
reflected the interests of Indian subjects rather than profit, and therefore promoted the 
colonial regime as an engine for progress.109 
Since the first articulation of the moral sentiments in the eighteenth century, then, 
which gradually reoriented sovereignty toward the needs of society; there emerged a 
universal concept of progress that eclipsed the desire to escape from conditions of war 
and imperialism.  Of particular relevance was the targeting of “Oriental despotism” – a 
broad category of non-liberal existence that, since the Enlightenment, “came to suggest 
the idea of unchecked power of an agrarian empire supported by the labour of slaves.”110  
In India, ‘Oriental despotism’ was associated with the Mughal Empire, which the EIC 
first encountered at its height in the seventeenth century.  The British viewed the Mughal 
regime as even “more oppressive” than its European counterparts.  It represented the 
harshest form of power.  Amongst India’s supposed afflictions during this period were 
political and economic instability, irrationality, and developmental stasis.111  J.S Mill 
stated that:   
At some period, however, of their history, almost every people, now civilized, 
have consisted, in majority, of slaves.  A people in that condition require to raise 
them out of it a very different polity from a nation of savages.  If they are 
energetic by nature, and especially if there be associated with them in the same 
community an industrious class who are neither slaves nor slave-owners…they 
need, probably no more to ensure their improvement than to make them free:  
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when freed, they may often be fit, like Roman freedmen, to be admitted at once 
into the full rights of citizenship.112   
 
Furthermore, ‘Oriental despotism’ was regarded as the absence of private 
property.  In Principles of Political Economy, J.S. Mill makes it clear that private 
property was the only means a backward society could ever progress.113  It was necessary 
to give expression to the individual subject and break the union between public and 
private spheres that existed in the so-called Indian “village system.”114  As described by 
Karl Marx, the village system was comprised of family communities based on domestic 
industry, shared labour, and self-supporting power.115  They were, in other words, 
communities of rural cultivators who employed family labour in order to produce for 
their own subsistence – or what is generally understood as the peasantry.116  Just as the 
peasantry was subject to disciplinary techniques of ‘pacification’ in England, peasants 
were even more vilified as enemies of liberal modernity in India.  In fact, they were 
“perceived to have the deepest attachments to the most dangerous elements of pre-
colonial society.”117  Operating firmly within a modern framework, Marx echoed the 
sentiments of nineteenth century liberals, writing that:  
We must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they 
may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental Despotism, that 	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they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it 
the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, 
depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.118   
 
The Economist, too, although it could not have differed any more greatly from 
Marx’s account of capitalist development, was intent on eliminating “traditional” 
elements of Indian society.  The Economist’s writings on India simultaneously disparaged 
Indian society and promoted the value of British influence, fearful of what India may 
become if left independent.  “We cannot doubt,” stated the paper, “that the arbitrary and 
onerous character of their religious customs, and the superstitious timidity of their 
general character, will be eventually and deeply influenced by the introduction of the new 
European arts.”119  According to the Economist, the mere existence of Indian customs, 
simply because they differed from the “moral” character of the British, were the “spring 
of all tyranny.”  Whereas the universal laws of modern political economy and the free 
individual would become, “if studied, trusted, and obeyed, the source of enlarging power 
and freedom.”120  By exposing Indian society to the civilizing influence of commerce, 
colonial subjects would be freed from their perceived servitude, and the “Asiatic mode of 
production” would be replaced by a more equitable, orderly, and rational system of 
political economy.   
The integration of Indian society into the circuits of capitalist production created a 
“Euro-Asiatic” interrelationship that colonial rule protected from “internal threats.”121  
Liberal colonialism therefore produces a racialized state of exception in which the 	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security of the human species depends on the ‘improvement’ of the colonized other.122  
The discourse of inferiority embedded in the ‘civilizing mission’ represents the belief that 
‘backward’ societies are inimical to the biopolitical foundations of liberal modernity.  
Here, it is evident what lies at the heart of liberal modernity is a pathology that demands 
liberalism to necessarily impose its account of humanity on colonized populations.  If 
liberalism is the only system capable of securing the welfare of the human species, as 
liberals claimed, it follows that everything else is understood as an obstruction.  Since the 
declared constituency of liberalism is all of human kind, the ‘threats’ that it seeks to 
negate have no delimiting boundary.123  The improvement liberalism seeks to impose is 
thus fundamentally unattainable, as there will always be something that lies ‘beyond the 
pale’.124  In colonial India, liberals confronted the inherent incompleteness of their project 
by ‘scientifically’ codifying ‘uncivilized’ forms of life.  This exacerbated the violence 
projected on the subject population, which was defined not only by the initial rupture of 
conquest, but also the increasingly rationalized, systemic violence carried out against 
those who are judged incompatible with the liberal priority to further the reproduction of 
the species.  The prejudices carried by nineteenth century liberals do not deviate from 
liberal values, but affirm them, and continually reproduce, in the manner described by 
Edward Said in Orientalism, the discursive justification for colonial rule.125   
Liberalism is constantly preoccupied with how to establish control over societies 
without governing too much.  The “liberal way of rule” succeeds by instituting the 
freedom of self-rule – by transforming subjects into individual agents that self-rule 	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through their interaction with the market.126  The idea of laissez-faire economics takes on 
another meaning here.  The unfettered individual is not only the means through which 
people are free to seek profit, but also represents the ‘success’ of producing the 
governable subjects that liberalism desires.  Liberalism, then, is not simply an economic 
theory, but is above all an “art of government,” as Foucault defined it, that incorporates 
the economics of market capitalism as its main technology. 127     
The theory established in this chapter stems from the preoccupations of liberal 
thinkers, first, in the eighteenth century and then into the nineteenth century.  Although 
not necessarily concerned with the problem of war in modernity, Adam Smith and other 
thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment presented a formula for the proper ordering of 
society.  Their vision centered on the role of the individual, who, if left to pursue their 
own self-interest without government interference, could thrive amidst justice and liberty.  
It follows, therefore, that if society is just and individuals are not confined by the 
arbitrary restrictions of autocratic regimes, then the conditions that create violence are 
eliminated, and the unifying bond of liberalism is established.  What is liberty, after all, if 
not the absence of harm in society?  Smith did, however, argue against colonialism and 
the mercantilist policies of the EIC in a more explicit manner.  With the help of Foucault, 
whose work compels a reinterpretation of liberal modernity, I have argued that the ‘moral 
sentiments’ that defined the attempt to remove life from the conditions of war legitimated 
the very violence they sought to eliminate, making it possible for liberal regimes to 
increasingly embody the warlike tendencies more typically associated with 
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authoritarianism.  This is evident in the fact that Britain reached its height of imperial 
power in the nineteenth century.  The ‘moral sentiments’ thus morphed, as the support 
J.S. Mill and the Economist declared for colonial rule in India shows, into the ‘civilizing 
mission’ of British imperialism – giving expression to the martial drivers of liberalism 
that were born in the eighteenth century.  This theory does not only shed light on the 
thought of British liberals, but is also essential for understanding what I believe is an 
otherwise unexplainable phenomenon in history: the process through which the demand 
for peace encouraged imperial aggression.  Although this thesis is primarily concerned 
with the nineteenth century, a discussion of eighteenth century liberal ideas was 
necessary because it served as an antecedent to colonial rule in India.  More importantly, 
though, the effort to promote the capacities of humanity became increasingly attached to 
the biological life of the species.  As I will show in the next chapter, this promotion of 
life depended on exposing society to the dynamics of liberal political economy, which 
was the primary motive for re-ordering Indian society in the nineteenth century.
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:  
ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION AND THE ‘PROCESS OF BECOMING 
CITIZENS 
 
“In truth, an infinite field of improvement lies before us.” – George Campbell 
This chapter examines the establishment of the permanent settlement of Bengal, 
the increased market orientation of peasant production, and the construction of a railroad 
network, which together constituted the most important elements of liberal political 
economy in nineteenth century India.  Although this transformation arguably did not 
improve existing conditions in India, the introduction of an economic system modeled 
after the European imagination was necessary, as British liberals claimed, to teach Indian 
subjects the lessons of ‘civilization.’  To demonstrate this, I will analyze the writings of 
the Economist, J.S. Mill, and John William Kaye.  Each of these liberal proponents had 
differing concerns regarding property, railroads, and race.  It is evident throughout their 
discourse, though, that the commercial dynamics of capitalism were understood to be 
necessary for the welfare of Indian society.  This welfare was dependent on Indian 
subjects defined by three corresponding factors.  The first was the ability to consume 
commodities.  This factor figured prominently in the Economist’s discussion of the EIC’s 
permanent settlement model of property, and the new privileges it apparently granted 
peasants.  The second was the imperative to perform labour as an end in itself, which was 
a primary concern of J.S. Mill in his Principles of Political Economy.  The third was the 
ability to self-govern.  That is, to regulate oneself in a marketized society.  Conformity to 
these factors combined is what allowed ‘life’ to flourish under the EIC’s system of 
‘indirect rule.’  It was necessary, moreover, as a means to enable liberal order to 
continually reproduce itself – a process, though, that was never complete and always 
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contested.  To begin, an overview of the EIC, and the historical changes produced by 
liberal political economy in nineteenth century India is necessary.      
 The EIC was founded on December 31, 1600.  It emerged amidst competition for 
imperial and mercantilist dominance between other European empires.  Spain, Portugal, 
and Holland were all adversaries to the British Empire.  The establishment of the EIC by 
Royal Charter in 1600 thus served to meet the demand of English merchants, who, 
wanting to challenge rival European trade, successfully petitioned the Crown. It was 
intended to be a joint-stock company with exclusive rights to trade in the east, with only 
restricted military powers.128  It followed a model set by the Dutch East India Company – 
its main rival for trade in the subcontinent.  From its inception, the EIC combined 
commercial and military methods to maintain a heavily armed colonial empire.129  It 
began as a European trading venture that sought to acquire riches from the east, but 
became, after one hundred and fifty years, a regime of outright conquest.  The EIC had 
been involved in several military skirmishes as a means to aggressively maintain its 
monopoly.  Although it established its presence in India during the seventeenth century, 
the eighteenth century represented the pinnacle of profitability for the EIC.  Its rise to 
prominence proved to be vitally important to the British state.   
These developments transformed dramatically as the Mughal Empire was faced 
with several major crises.  The emergence of powerful regional polities seeking to 
challenge the authority of the Mughal Empire created rivalries between new regional 	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states.  Competition for resources, trade routes, and other sources of revenue led to 
internalized warfare.  But the presence of rival European powers also weakened the 
Mughal Empire, as they tried to exploit local instability to their own advantage.130  This 
led to the increased militarization of the EIC, which, in an attempt to maintain its 
competitive advantage and defend itself against local military confrontations, found itself 
amassing military forces.  This also led to the EIC’s more direct engagement in Indian 
affairs and politics.  Of particular importance was the conquest of Bengal – India’s 
richest province, and the first large territory acquired by the EIC in 1757.  This was 
prompted in 1756, when the Nawab of Bengal seized Calcutta in an attempt to defend the 
region from a suspected overthrow by the British.  Many company servants were 
imprisoned and died in what is known as the “Black Hole” incident.131  Whether or not 
the British planned a takeover or not, they used the incident as an example of Indian 
cruelty, in order to justify violent intervention in Bengal.  After the army of Colonel 
Robert Clive defeated the Nawab’s armies the Battle of Plassey, the EIC was installed as 
the state’s effective rulers.132   
This initiated a succession of wars that inaugurated the EIC as a regime of 
colonial conquest.  The resources acquired after gaining control of Bengal allowed the 
EIC to dominate contests among other regional states.133  Secured revenue collecting 
rights and unimpeded trading access throughout the region created a larger financial base 
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that it used to expand its capacity to rule.134  Charges of Indian misgovernment became 
the rationale for the ongoing seizure of land.135  In 1794, an East India Company Act 
designed to subordinate EIC authority directly to the British government was passed, and 
a Board of Control was established to supervise its activities.  Importantly, both James 
Wilson and J.S. Mill were intimately connected to the Board of Control.  Wilson served 
as Secretary of Finance, and J.S. Mill – following his father James – served as the 
‘reader’ who reviewed all correspondence between the EIC’s Court of Directors and 
British agents in India.136  In 1813, an act was passed to end the EIC’s monopoly.  From 
then on it made most of its income from land revenue, not trade.  And in 1833, The 
Government of India Act was passed, which exemplified a new administrative focus.137     
It was during this time that the EIC made its final conquests.  Having extended its 
frontier to Burma in the east, and Nepal in the north by the mid-nineteenth century, the 
EIC sought to annex the Punjab, where local disputes created an opportunity for 
intervention.138  This led to the first Sikh War in 1845, and the eventual installation of 
British authority in the western province.139  The EIC’s turn to conquest represented a 
significant shift within the British Empire.  With the conquest of the Punjab, the EIC 
brought the whole subcontinent under its control.140  By 1850, the former trading venture 
was a colonial regime that ruled over a vast indigenous population.  Capable of waging 
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war and administering justice, the EIC came to resemble a modern state in European 
terms.141  Although the ideal nature of governance for its subjects was a matter of debate, 
one thing was certain:  the institution of property.  It was with the establishment of the 
permanent settlement that property became “the basic principle of government” in 
colonial India.142  As historian Mike Davis has demonstrated, far from making agriculture 
more efficient, the ‘improvement’ encouraged by securing property in land was entirely 
detrimental to the existing agrarian order and social life in India.143 
When the permanent settlement was established, notes Ranajit Guha, the British 
knew nothing about the agrarian system in India.  As he stated, its “quasi-feudal” rights 
and obligations “defied any attempt at interpretation in Western terms.”144  It was 
precisely because of the unfamiliarity of the agrarian system of India that the British 
sought to impose liberal order, and enforce conformity to the liberal norm of property. 
Without property, “improvements,” wrote supreme council of Bengal member Sir Philip 
Francis, “are not to be expected; for who will employ his money or his labour in the 
cultivation of a soil that does not belong to him.”145  Instead, the British dismissed the 
capacities of the existing system, reflecting Francis’s statement that Bengal had been 
“ruined by the rapacity of imprudent farmers.”146  It was only by instituting, as the 
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founders of the permanent settlement claimed, ‘a rule of property,’ that British landlords 
could make Indian peasants productive.   
Contrary to the arguments presented in Orientalist literature, markets did exist in 
precolonial India.  In fact, precolonial Bengal was one of the most commercialized and 
market oriented agricultural systems in the world.  The reason it defied interpretation in 
Western terms, then, was not due to a lack of property, but rather because its complexity 
and sophistication escaped the narrow confines of liberal universalism.  The EIC thus 
sought to simplify the agrarian system in Bengal, and having conquered the region, 
render it conducive to a European system of political economy.  But the EIC did not want 
to establish its dominion by directly controlling landed property.   The enormous distance 
between Britain and India, combined with doubts as to whether the climate of India could 
support a European ‘colony,’ instead led the EIC to entrust landed property to a class of 
indigenous entrepreneurs known as Zamindars, who were also tax collectors under the 
Mughal Empire.  Zamindars were hired for periods of twenty to thirty years, to serve the 
role of property owners who collected revenue from peasants who cultivated the land 
directly.   
The institution of property greatly exacerbated peasant insecurity.  The 
historiography of this period holds that the permanent settlement rapidly diminished the 
size of peasant land holdings to the point that they were unable to sustain themselves with 
subsistence crops.147  If peasants were unable to pay this revenue from their earnings, due 
to the volatility of the market economy, they were forced to take credit from 
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moneylenders, leading to a cycle of indebtedness.148  This alienation then led to the 
effective ‘proletarianization’ of the peasantry, who, if not forced from their land 
completely, became modern agricultural workers.  This argument, however, maintains the 
Orientalist vision held by nineteenth century British liberals – that agrarian Bengal was 
not advanced enough to adapt to the production of cash crops.  Peasants in Bengal 
certainly became indebted, but for much different reasons.  In the Zamindar system of 
precolonial India, taxes fluctuated depending on the weather and value of the crops.  The 
EIC though, in order to generate profits, imposed a fixed rate of taxation that Zamindars 
were to collect from peasants, regardless of how good the harvest was.  This system was 
made worse for peasant farmers because The EIC used its dominance to reduce the price 
of Indian cotton.  This encouraged the growth of long staple cotton, which demanded 
more water and was more vulnerable to drought.  In reality, peasants rarely lost access to 
their land and seldom became wage labourers simply put.  Their increased poverty 
instead stemmed from artificially inflated taxes, and the ability of the EIC to influence 
the marketing of their products.   
The process of creating European models of property that began in Bengal spread 
over a long period as the British extended their rule over different regions of India.149  
Property in land also took on different forms than the permanent settlement model.  The 
Raiyatawari system, for example, gave peasants themselves control of the land in return 
for a payment to the Government of India.150  In much of Northern India, this rent was 
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changed to a village payment.  Debate surrounding these models amongst British officials 
had to do with the length of term, the amount of rent, and who, be it Zamindar or ‘Ryot,’ 
paid it to whom.  Both systems, though, were designed to induce peasants to produce 
more for the market.   
Railroads were another instrument of liberal political economy.  Between 1845 
and 1875, British companies invested 95 million pounds in the construction of Indian 
railroads – the largest international flow of capital in the nineteenth century.151   This 
contributed to the construction of 25,936 miles of railroad by the year 1900.152  The 
government of India was explicitly concerned about the need to facilitate improved 
methods of transport of primary commodities for both internal and external markets.153  
In order to stimulate the export of Indian cotton and other raw materials to England, the 
EIC, as the effective government of India, guaranteed a five percent return for British 
companies investing in Indian railroads.  This meant that the return was paid for 
primarily through taxes imposed on Indian peasants.154  Interestingly, it was James 
Wilson as Secretary of Finance who recommended this guarantee to the Board of 
Control.   Between 1834 and 1850, British imports of raw material from India, such as 
cotton and wool, more than quadrupled.155  This increase in production was undoubtedly 
a result of the new systems of land ownership, but was certainly aided by Wilson’s 	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railroad scheme that “fostered increased British penetration of interior markets of India, 
and provided a risk free vent for surplus capital for British capitalists.”156  Furthermore, 
railroads were a military endeavor.  They were used to accelerate the means of 
communication and security in an increasingly surveillant colonial state.   
Now, having outlined these historical changes, I will discuss how they figured 
into the writings of the Economist, J.S. Mill, and Kaye.  The Economist was a particularly 
strong advocate of the permanent settlement, and, regardless of the damage caused by the 
EIC in Bengal, denied its exploitative nature.  “We,” wrote the Economist on behalf of 
the British, “are endeavouring to improve India into full commercial civilization.”157  
Therefore, “the incessant and inextricable insertion of capital into land” is required.158  
Contrary to much criticism of the permanent – or “perpetual” – settlement that also 
emerged during this period, the Economist argued that the only way to intensify 
agricultural production in India was to give individuals – rather than the state – the 
ownership of rent.  Indeed, the paper’s adamant defense of this system was spurred by 
numerous attacks against it.  In its reaction, the Economist notes that Asian societies, 
particularly India, had adopted a system whereby the state owned the land, whereas in 
Europe, individuals had appropriated land.159  Other prominent liberal thinkers such as 
James Mill, noted the paper, believed that it was preferable to build a colonial 
government on this model of “Asiatic” land ownership.  If so, the colonial regime could 
simply replace Indian authorities and extract revenue in the same manner.  The 
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Economist’s concern with enhancing the capacities of Indian subjects, though, meant that 
it understood the state’s claim to ultimate ownership of the land as the principal cause of 
India’s “arrested civilization.”160  By leasing the land to Zamindars, production would 
increase because of their incentive to draw capital to the soil, and improve the land they 
owned ‘privately.’  Here, the Economist is essentially making an argument for no state 
intervention into the Indian economy.  Although the paper certainly misunderstood the 
degree to which land in precolonial India was owned by the state, it was in favour of the 
permanent settlement because it embodied a system in which individuals were 
encouraged to increase the quantity of their production and pursue profits.  “No 
landowner would dare to spend a shilling on the improvement of his estate,” after all, if 
there was no economic incentive to do so.  It is for this reason that the Economist 
denounced any imposed and “arbitrary” exaction of rent.”161  As the paper stated:   
In so far, therefore, as we day by day improve India into the state to which we 
ought to improve it, and are anxiously endeavoring to improve it, in so far shall 
we find it needful to abandon our principle of preserving the rent, or the 
augmented rent of land for the use of the government.162   
 
The progress of India had been impeded, in other words, by the customs of 
‘Oriental despotism,’ which prohibited individuals from realizing their self-interest.  
There was a stark difference, however, between what the Economist thought was 
happening in India and the reality of the permanent settlement.  The paper expressed that 
the rapid increase in production was a result of subjects’ newfound ability to pursue their 
economic interests.  The increased economic welfare of subjects, in turn, allowed the EIC 
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to tax peasants and Zamindars in order to generate the revenue necessary to fund its 
colonial regime.  But this was actually prompted by the regime’s entirely contradictory 
fixed rate of taxation, which, along with the ability of the EIC to influence prices, 
culminated in the “single most important act in the dispossession of Indian peasants.”163  
This process was not, in other words, the result of letting the ‘natural’ stages of capitalist 
development unfold.  It was rather the product of the government “exactions” that the 
Economist so adamantly denounced.  “It is a notorious fact, known to everyone who has 
the slightest acquaintance with India,” wrote the Economist, “that the terms upon which 
land was formerly held…have undergone great modification and improvement.”164  Thus, 
the large increase in quantities of Indian goods imported to Britain instead provided, for 
the paper, “proof of the improved condition of the cultivators of the soil.”165  Moreover, 
the permanent settlement model of property in land encouraged what was thought to be 
the correct pattern of human development.  In defending the Government of India from 
charges of prejudice and abuse, the Economist cited the developmental influence of the 
permanent settlement on the people of India: 
When it is asserted…that the natives of British India are not only poor, but are in 
a declining state, and are becoming every year poorer, we believe such assertions 
to be contrary to well-known and admitted facts.  All trustworthy evidence goes to 
prove that not only are the condition of the great masses of the people infinitely 
better than it was when they became British subjects, but also than that of the 
people of any of the native states.166  
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The Economist also reduced any Indian opposition to the permanent settlement as 
a product of India’s cultural stasis – its reluctance to accept ‘change’ and modernity.167  
In reality, Indian subjects’ resistance to the EIC’s regime of property was a legitimate 
defense of their livelihood.  An important aspect of the permanent settlement’s 
developmental properties, according to the Economist, was its ability to create a new 
class of Indian consumers.  While the paper rejected the argument that government 
exactions were the cause of the country’s increasing production during the early to mid 
nineteenth century, it pointed to the “fact” that the increased exports to Britain were 
accompanied by “increased [British] exports to India for the use of the natives.”168  As 
production increased, so too did the means of the people, who, with their increased 
profits, could enjoy the amenities of commercial civilization.  The Economist saw in 
India “the demand for the consumption of the people, of foreign productions…steadily 
and greatly augmenting.”169  Even though the permanent settlement jeopardized the 
welfare of Indian peasants more than any other measure taken by the British, the 
Economist asserted that it “secured” the cultivator, who was now free to “obtain” all the 
“advantages” that came along with the enhanced value of the land.170  Whether the 
permanent settlement helped to facilitate a new class of Indian consumers, or simply 
increased the abundance of European products for an already existing class of consumers, 
the perceived transformation of ‘backward’ peasants into consumers of material goods, 
via their dispossession, was one of the desired effects in the reorganization of Indian 
society.  It is evident in the Economist, in other words, that one of the aspects that 	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comprised the ideal liberal subject is the ability to consume.  Not only, as a means for 
them to maintain the cycle of capitalist production, but also to ensure their welfare 
through material prosperity.  Private property – or “the striking contrast to the old way of 
assessing the land according the nature of the crop upon it” – was the driving force 
behind this transformation.171 
The Raiyatawari system, on the other hand, was viewed as far more favourable to 
the permanent settlement by the ‘utilitarian’ school of liberals, including J.S. Mill.  In The 
Principles of Political Economy, J.S. Mill criticizes the permanent settlement, stating 
that:  
England being accustomed to great estates and great landlords…took it for 
granted that India must possess the like; and looking round for some set of people 
who might be taken for the objects of their search, they pitched upon a sort of tax-
gatherers called Zamindars.172   
 
In fact, J.S. Mill recognized the complexity of precolonial India’s economy to a much 
greater degree than the Economist, and certainly most colonial administrators.  He 
attributed the EIC’s “mistakes” in Bengal to “the inability of ordinary minds to imagine a 
state of social relations fundamentally different from those with which they are 
practically familiar.”173  As such, the permanent settlement did not do enough to enhance 
the agency of peasant cultivators, and instead endowed “a useless body of great landlords 
with gifts from the public revenue.”174  As the Raiyatawari model spread, most notably in 
the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, it supposedly enhanced the position of peasants by 
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reducing their dependence on the Zamindari class.175  For J.S. Mill, this form of peasant 
proprietorship worked to “free” peasants from their “traditional” restraints, allowing them 
to be more independent in their pursuit of self-interest.  However, although J.S. Mill’s 
critique of the permanent settlement seemingly stemmed from a more compassionate 
position, the direct peasant proprietorship that the Raiyatawari system offered was also 
destructive.  J.S. Mill was clear that an even more individualistic model best served the 
welfare of Indian peasants.  To foster this agency, though, was not a matter of ending 
colonialism, but was entirely dependent on colonial rule.  For J.S. Mill, colonialism, 
historically speaking, was essentially a means to induce subject populations to labour for 
their own benefit.176  Importantly, the labour that British rule in India was meant to 
induce, was not simply meant to serve the regime’s goal of extracting surplus value.  
Rather, as a specifically liberal form colonialism, EIC rule sought to turn peasants into 
instruments for social progress.177  That is, to make life itself “productive.”   
 J.S. Mill was certainly confused about the state of productivity in India prior to 
EIC rule, which was indeed, highly efficient, though to see it this way requires us to 
jettison the liberal understanding of productive labour.  To be sure, J.S. Mill’s thought 
rests on the assumption that in order to be legitimate, the labour of Indian peasants 
needed to embody the notion of productivity according to liberal ideology.  “To civilize a 
savage,” wrote J.S. Mill, “he must be inspired with new wants and desires, even if not a 
very elevated kind, provided that their gratification can be a motive to steady and regular 
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exertion.”178  It was not enough, in other words, that the interests of Indian peasants are 
served, but that their labour, regardless of its role in their actual welfare, is an end in 
itself.  Furthermore, “A state of mere indolence is the most fruitless and hopeless 
condition of a human being.  It is the most obstinate of hindrances to improvement; 
almost any means are good for getting rid of it.”179  Indian peasants, of course, were by 
no means “indolent.”  To the contrary, they did what they could to survive under the 
colonial regime’s expanding influence and power, and historically adapted to a variety of 
circumstances.  The perception of India as underdeveloped in its productive capacities 
instead stemmed from the universalism ascribed to liberal political economy, and the 
distinction between “productive” and “unproductive” labour.  According to J.S. Mill:  
“Unproductive labour…will be understood as labour which does not terminate in the 
creation of material wealth; which, however largely or successfully practiced, does not 
render the community, and the world at large, richer in material products.180   
 Although J.S. Mill disagreed with the benefits of the permanent settlement that 
the Economist championed, his thought echoes the paper’s sentiment that the British 
needed to instill the “effective desire of accumulation” in Indian subjects.181  “Backward” 
societies such as India were, according to J.S. Mill, deficient in this desire.  The role of 
the British was thus to provide the proper guidance for Indian subjects, who although 
being developed as ‘free’ individuals, “cannot be trusted to govern themselves.”182  For 
J.S. Mill, it is precisely this notion of productive labour that defines the ideal liberal 
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subject.  In becoming productive, India could follow “the leading countries of the world” 
toward the progress of modern society, defined by increasing economic capacities of 
individuals.183 
 This utilitarianism speaks to the alliance between the economic and the biological 
that exists in liberalism.  According to J.S. Mill, political economy was an extremely 
modern phenomenon in the nineteenth century.  The subject with which it deals – the 
“condition of mankind” – however, was an age-old dilemma.  By modernizing this 
problematic, political economy came to find that human well-being was best enabled 
through the increase of economic wealth and material prosperity.184  That British rule in 
India was a biopolitical project is demonstrated in the way that liberal political economy 
was defined as a means to increase the innovative capacities of human life.  Economic 
and biological production were thus attached inasmuch as one leads to the other.  As J.S. 
Mill states: 
All know that it is one thing to be rich, another thing to be enlightened, brave, or 
humane; that the questions how a nation is made wealthy, and how it is made free, 
or virtuous, or eminent in literature, in the fine arts, in arms, or in polity, are 
totally distinct enquiries.  Those things, indeed, are all indirectly connected, and 
react upon one another.185   
The benefits that extend to the social realm were to be consolidated under a regime of 
private property, which, for J.S. Mill, signified the beginning of progress: 
The political economist, for a considerable time to come, will be chiefly 
concerned with the conditions of existence and progress belonging to a society 
founded on private property and individual competition; and that the object to be 
principally aimed at in the present stage of human improvement, is not the 
subversion of the system of individual property, but the improvement of it, and 
the full participation of every member of the community in its benefits.186 	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For J.S. Mill, the industrial capacities of India were limited by a “deficiency of town 
population.”187  Meaning that India supposedly lacked a large urban population that 
would be conducive to industrial capitalism.  Instead: 
The agriculture of India is conducted entirely on the system of small holdings.  
There is, however, a considerable amount of combination of labour.  The village 
institutions and customs, which are the real framework of Indian society, make 
provision for joint action in the cases in which it is seen to be necessary...The 
implements and processes of agriculture are however so wretched, that the 
produce of the soil, in spite of great natural fertility and a climate highly 
favourable to vegetation, is miserably small.188 
 
In order to stimulate population growth and “develop the productive resources of India,” 
J.S. Mill suggested that India rapidly increase the quantities of agricultural products 
exported to European markets.189  The increased market orientation of Indian peasants – 
like property in one form or another – received practically universal support amongst 
liberal thinkers because it helped to shape the self-governing individual.   
This element of liberal subjectivity was stated particularly well in the work of 
Kaye.  By creating liberal subjects through the installation of political economy, the 
British were able, in his words, to “make the rude barbarians themselves the agents of 
their own civilization.”190  During its period of  ‘indirect rule,’ the EIC worked to 
establish a system of liberal governance in which subjects were freed through the 
institution of property, and subsequently enabled to better their own material conditions 
through the marketization of their production.  “The servants of the Company,” wrote 
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Kaye, “have reclaimed men whose savage propensities had been aggravated and 
seemingly perpetuated by the cruel discipline, the unscrupulous oppression of their 
masters.”191  The EIC could “remedy” this “evil”, not by governing directly, but rather by 
installing liberal political economy.192  The goal of liberal governance in India was, in 
other words, to insert subjects into the machinery of marketized production.  The 
transformation occurred, according to Kaye, when Indian peasants no longer suffered 
under the oppression of their previously despotic rulers, and were taught the virtues of 
financial prosperity.  In such as system, peasants were guided by their own self-interest, 
rather than any perceived allegiance “to the most degraded superstitions.”193  Indeed, the 
success of liberal governance depended on the degree to which individuals could regulate 
themselves.   
But of course, the installation of political economy in India was inseparable from 
violence.  Although Kaye perceived “the plough” to be the “chief civilizer,” the British 
nevertheless relied on a coercive machinery in order to ensure, for example, that taxes 
were paid.194  As such, although the British sought to “abstain” from displays of outright 
violence, Kaye also recognized that it was necessary, on certain occasions “to habituate 
them to the customs of civilized life.”195  The ability of the EIC to rule indirectly, too, 
depended on the everyday violence of dispossession.  By no means could liberal rule 
simply adhere to its stated ideals and let Indian society exist without interference.  
Instead, the colonial efforts of the EIC in the first half of the nineteenth century, which 
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appear to contradict the liberal idea of individual liberty, provide an example of liberal 
principles in full effect.  In India, such actions were experimental, inasmuch as India 
served as a testing ground for the creation of a liberal society through the application of 
violence.   
The construction of railroads in India also constituted an act of dispossession 
celebrated by the Economist.  The paper wrote that “we rejoice in being able at length to 
congratulate the commercial and manufacturing public of this country, and all who are in 
any way connected with, or interested in, the progress of our Indian empire, that 
arrangements have been at length definitely completed for the introduction of 
railways.”196  This enthusiasm can certainly be attributed to the benefits that England 
received from improved transportation in India.  But railroads were also said to have an 
incredibly civilizing effect in India.  According to the Economist:  “Among these 
principles some of the most remarkable have been the systematic efforts of Lord 
Dalhousie’s Government to render railways not merely a successful commercial 
speculation, but a widely civilizing influence.”197  Above all, “the social results of the 
Indian railways will be at least as great and penetrating as the commercial results.”198   
 The regime of private property and the construction of railroads raise one of the 
most fundamental contradictions of the liberal colonial state.  Proponents of political 
economy argued that capitalist development was a ‘natural’ process.  That it occurred, in 
other words, without governmental interference, and was stimulated by people whose 
liberty allowed them to create economic progress.  In reality, the construction of political 
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economy as a form of liberal governance required not only the forceful dispossession of 
peasants, but also the direct intervention of the colonial state.  The rise of capitalist 
relations of production, then, is better understood as a process of primitive accumulation, 
or “accumulation by dispossession.”199   
Accumulation by dispossession refers to the process through which capital is 
created.  Building on Karl Marx’s original argument made in Capital, David Harvey 
argues that the initial requirements for capitalism such as raw materials and empty land, 
did not, historically speaking, exist naturally.  Instead, they were produced by the forceful 
expulsion of peasant populations and the conversion of common land into private 
property.200  This occurred in India as the British manipulated existing markets in Bengal 
by introducing a fixed rate of taxation.  This process was also evident in the state’s 
guaranteed return on railroad investment.  Railroads were definitely a central concern of 
the Economist.  According to the paper, the five percent return on investment was “wise,” 
not simply because it was Wilson’s suggestion, but as a means to stimulate industry in a 
country where, because of its indolence, there was no commercial demand.201  As the 
paper stated: 
We hold this undertaking, and the support it has received from the East India 
Company to be of the first importance.  Not only as a source of supply for cotton 
and other valuable raw material, but as a market for our manufactures.  Our 
possessions in India hold out prospects of increase yet undeveloped, of which, 
even our present extensive trade gives no adequate notion.202 
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Perhaps surprisingly, Wilson, who also felt that government interference in the 
market caused “the greatest social inconveniences”, made this argument.203  The 
Economist referred to racial and religious difference to excuse the colonial regime’s use 
of force and heavy government legislation.204  As the paper stated: 
Railways cannot but exercise a remarkable influence in giving the Hindus a fresh 
sense at once of the narrowness of their circle of time-honoured thoughts, and of 
the vast results of the study of physical science which they have as yet so 
completely neglected.  We cannot doubt that the arbitrary and onerous character 
of their religious customs, and the superstitious timidity of their general character, 
will be eventually and deeply influenced by the introduction of the new European 
arts.205   
 
While race was certainly a factor in the Government of India’s intervention into 
the economy, the objective of those liberal commentators who talked about EIC rule in 
India was not simply to excuse a regime that exploited Indian society for material gain.  
Liberal colonialism in India, in other words, was not founded on the need to provide 
Britain with raw materials, markets, and space for profitable investment, as many theories 
of capitalist imperialism hold.206  Dispossession and intervention into the economy was 
rather a microcosm of liberal colonialism as a whole.  Capitalism was integral to the 
biopolitical conceptualization of life.  As the British attempted to universalize industrial 
capitalism in the nineteenth century, their understanding of how society should to be 
organized was increasingly confined, with the goal of having life replicate, or at least 
mimic the processes of capitalist production.   
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 In this chapter I have shown how the construction of liberal political economy 
was essential to the humanitarian motives and biopolitics of liberal colonialism in India.  
Together, the permanent settlement of Bengal and the Raiytwari systems of property, the 
increased market orientation of peasant production, and railroad technology, helped to 
shape Indian society according to liberalism’s limited account of humanity.  According to 
the writings of the Economist, J.S. Mill and Kaye, life was improved by increasing Indian 
subjects’ ability to consume, labour, and self-govern.  These were the requirements, in 
other words, needed to create subjects ideally suited to furthering the productive 
capacities of the species.  Political economy was therefore the main principle of colonial 
organization to which peasants needed to simultaneously adapt and work to create, in 
order to maintain the ‘indirect rule’ of the EIC.  The colonial reordering of India reflected 
what Foucault described as the ‘process of becoming citizens.’207  The dispossession that 
occurred by exposing Indian peasants to the commercial dynamics of capitalism did not 
defy the liberal ideals expressed in colonial discourse.  Though a contradiction, the 
violence of colonial intervention was simply the cost required to enable Indian subjects’ 
pursuit of material prosperity, and insert them into machinery ultimately designed for the 
“preservation of peace.”208  By 1850, the British Empire encompassed approximately 
350,000,000 inhabitants and 6, 539, 685 square miles.209  At this time, the majority of its 
subjects were subsistence peasants.210  The industrial development of England that the 
Economist attributed to its “commercial spirit” was significantly aided through the 
exploitation of peasants under the colonial state’s regime of property.  Industrialization 	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enabled Britain to finance its empire, which, in the nineteenth century was threatened by 
various anti-colonial movements.  Among the most significant was the Indian mutiny-
rebellion of 1857.  As will be shown further in the next chapter, it was the preoccupation 
with conformity to political economy – as the means to promote life – that drove 
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THE MUTINY-REBELLION OF 1857:  KNOWLEDGE, RACE, AND THE 
“NECROPOLITICAL AUDIT” OF ‘LIFE’ 
 
“Colonial knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it.” – Bernard Cohn 
This chapter examines the Indian mutiny-rebellion of 1857 that led to the ouster 
of the EIC, and the direct rule of India by the British government in 1858.  It 
demonstrates how the uprising symbolized an act of resistance against the forces of 
liberal political economy that reorganized the constitution of life in India.  As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the rule of property, the marketization of peasant production, and 
the ability to self-govern were together understood to enhance the lives of Indian 
subjects.  It follows, therefore, that those subjects who rejected their subjugation to this 
regime represented a biopolitical threat to the construction of liberal order.  In its defense 
of the measures taken by the Government of India to suppress the revolt, the Economist 
insisted that the rebellion was isolated amongst unruly mutineers.  Indeed, as a powerful 
voice of political economy, the paper wanted to preserve the liberal policies enacted in 
India, and deny the revolt’s more widespread character.  Although the Economist could 
not admit to the deteriorating conditions that liberal political economy actually produced 
for Indian peasants, the paper contradicted itself by stating that the rebellion helped to 
reinforce British authority – which was necessary for the proper development of Indian 
society – suggesting that the mutiny-rebellion was in fact a generalized revolt.  I argue, 
however, that the Government of India’s vengeful response to the rebellion represented 
an attack on Indian subjects who sought to escape the confines of liberal order, and define 
the constitution of life in their own terms.  
Importantly, violence in the post-rebellion state was increasingly racialized.  In an 
effort to more effectively contain anticolonial resistance, the British developed a colonial 
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knowledge system that linked the industrial capacities of Indian subjects to their physical 
characteristics.  This process was marked by a rapid increase in ethnological literature 
and practices.  The writings of George Campbell, for example, provide evidence of the 
racial ideology that took shape during the aftermath of the mutiny-rebellion.  The 
Economist also perceived race to be the ultimate indicator of economic abilities, and 
therefore relentlessly encouraged political economy as a means to manage the “darker 
races.”211  Through an analysis of these writings, and with reference to John William 
Kaye and J.S. Mill, I argue that the generation of knowledge in India served as a form of 
liberal-colonial governance.  As these sources indicate, political economy itself acted as a 
means to survey the population.  Those that fell outside its gaze were viewed as inimical 
to the reproduction of the species and needed to be reintegrated – it was argued, into the 
system of capitalist production that codified their position within the colonial hierarchy.   
The Indian mutiny-rebellion was born out of grievances among Indian members 
of the Bengal Army known as Sepoys.  On May 9, 1857, mutineers in the town of Meerut 
broke into two jails to release prisoners.  Over the course of 1857, rebels attacked a total 
of 41 prisons, and released over 23,000 prisoners.  During the rebellion, one hundred 
thousand troops in the Bengal Army mutinied.212  This mutiny quickly spread, however, 
to encompass other disaffected groups within Indian society.  Social unrest spread across 
the Northwest provinces of India as the largest rebellion in the history of the nineteenth 
century British Empire developed.213  The mutiny-rebellion has attracted considerable 
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controversy.  Indeed, its multi-faceted character has produced various explanations 
among historians.  Leading up to the revolt, landholders, landlords, and tenants had all 
been involved in riots, and in 1857 huge amounts of the North Indian peasantry rebelled.  
This revolt – and the disputes that preceded it – was sparked by a diverse combination of 
local concerns about the economic hardship produced by the EIC’s revenue demands.  
Each episode can be traced, in other words, to the Company’s policy to increase revenue 
and monopolize its political authority.214  The colonial discourse of British chroniclers, 
however, in an effort to reduce the significance of Indian grievances with EIC policy, 
dismissed the extent of this civil rebellion.215 
The Economist, for example, insisted that the rebellion was connected exclusively 
to the Bengal army, and did not represent an anticolonial revolt.216    To whatever degree 
the Economist chose to ignore the diversity of resistance in order to quell concern about 
the colonial regime’s status, and preserve the paradigm of liberal rule in India, the paper’s 
position reflects the historiographical construction of Indian peoples – especially peasants 
– as having no historical agency whatsoever.  The Economist argued that the social 
benefits and developmental effect of British rule were too important to be sacrificed.  
“For what better purpose do we hold India,” wrote the paper, “than its gradual 
enlightenment and the judicious amelioration of the native character, institutions, and 
customs?”217  Faced with this crisis, the Economist argued that to relinquish control of 
India would be to sacrifice the moral obligations of the British to improve the lives of 
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Indian subjects, and abandon the march of civilization in a “strangely petrified” world.218  
Furthermore: 
The India Company aided by the Government, has acquired the whole of India, 
and, having acquired it, we have no alternative but to maintain possession.  For all 
the world, not merely for England and India, the gradual extension of our 
dominion there has been very advantageous, and the commotion that threatens our 
power, and will impede the traffic between India and other countries, is nothing 
less than a great social calamity.219 
  
The paper’s position held that the rebellion could not have been an expression of 
anticolonialism because Indian subjects simply did not possess the political faculties to 
do so.  The rebellion was thus viewed as fundamentally apolitical.  Indeed, colonial rule 
was justified, as the Economist demonstrates, on the presumed absence of political 
communities in India.220 
 The fact that the paper dismissed the magnitude of the Indian mutiny-rebellion 
suggests, though, that it did pose a legitimate threat to British dominion.  Evidence shows 
that the rebellion, despite efforts to minimize its effects, did in fact involve numerous 
sectors of Indian society.  This raises the issue addressed by Subaltern Studies as to how 
to portray historically oppressed classes without speaking for them or appropriating their 
cause.221  Indeed, historians have grappled with the issue of how to “extract” subaltern 
experiences and perspectives from colonial archives.222  As such, in my explanation of 
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the rebellion, I do not attempt to speak for Indian peasants and their reasons for resistance 
against British rule.  I do, however, follow the line of argument made by Ranajit Guha in 
Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, that amongst its diverse 
forces, the rebellion displayed an overall ‘political’ character that not only refuted the 
European notion of linear progress, but also sought to disrupt the foundations of colonial 
sovereignty.223 
 To be political, notes Julian Reid is to possess the desire to create change and 
overcome conditions of hardship.  To claim that the Indian mutiny-rebellion was an act of 
anticolonial resistance is not to speak for the Indian subjects who were engaged in it.  Nor 
is it an attempt to capture the essence of the revolt in a “singular” manner.224   Rather, it 
is to identify its undeniably political character that demonstrates the agency of Indian 
subjects.  This political character, according to Guha, was represented through attacks on 
symbols of British rule such as telegraph offices, railways, factories, and importantly, 
prisons.225  Prisons, of course, were attacked for practical purposes – as a means to 
mobilize support for the rebellion.  But they were also attacked for symbolic reasons, as 
Indian mutineers and rebels viewed them as one of the principal instruments of colonial 
rule and its multiple cultural transgressions.226  These crimes were also fundamentally 
attached to liberal political economy – the main vehicle driving the biopolitical 
reorganization of colonial India in the nineteenth century.  Thus, although the revolt 
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encompassed many diverse motives, it represented an act of resistance against the regime 
of capital imposed by the EIC, and its diffuse effects that reverberated throughout India.   
 Certain events and processes in the reorganization of Indian society support this 
argument.  In 1856, for example, the EIC annexed the province of Awadh on the grounds 
that its ruler had mismanaged the territory to the point of corruption.  Due to the 
pernicious effects of the Company’s new land settlement, local resentment grew such that 
Awadh became one of the main centres in the rebellion.227  Furthermore, the shift in the 
structure of trade was an important factor in the stimulus of unrest.  EIC policy 
fundamentally altered the pattern of Indian trade by drawing the subcontinent into the 
instability of the global economy.  By the time of the mutiny-rebellion, local patterns of 
production and consumption had changed to the point that India’s trading position was 
reversed.  Instead of exporting finished products, India exported its raw materials such as 
cotton and opium.228  The effects of annexation, land settlement, and market orientation 
pressured communities that were already on the margins of society.  Their acts of 
resistance in the rebellion were therefore an expression of livelihoods lost.229 
Interestingly, the Economist argued that Indian Sepoys mutinied because they 
were institutionally isolated from the ‘improvements’ taking place throughout the 
country.  The paper cited irrigation, canals, roads, railroads, and schools as examples of 
examples of India’s ‘prosperity.’  Furthermore, it was the ‘freedom’ to labour that 
supposedly pacified Indian subjects.  It was therefore the ‘unoccupied lives of Sepoy 
soldiers, who, removed from these modern amenities, rose up in anger.  They were not, in 
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other words, inserted into the machinery of liberal political economy to the same degree 
as the peasantry.  The logic of this argument is by all means flawed, not only because 
Sepoys fulfilled a necessary role in the maintenance of British rule, but also because it 
was precisely the subjugation to capital that exacerbated peasant insecurity and ultimately 
led to their involvement in the revolt.230   
 This does, however, speak to the notion of production as synonymous with the 
improvement of human life.  If Indian peasants resisted EIC rule because of its 
exploitative policies, it follows that what they were resisting was their biopolitical 
subjugation:  the system, that is, that attempted to reduce their existence to the 
instruments necessary to secure liberal forms of life – the subject that labours, consumes, 
and self-regulates.  That which defies this liberal norm was inimical to the colonial 
regime.  The takeover of India by the British government itself in 1858 resulted in the 
complete remilitarization of the colonial state, and culminated in the blasting of prisoners 
to death by tying their bodies over the mouths of cannons.231  This response was 
supported by the Economist because, as the paper wrote, “The Hindus are like young 
children; they have no distinct idea of what they want; they know they are miserably poor 
and wretched; they abide and seek no remedy.”232  The British had a responsibility to 
repress the rebellion, in other words, in order to “save India from herself.”233   
Reflecting in 1858 on the “crisis” that unfolded in the past year, the paper stated 
that because of the brutality committed by Indian rebels, British rule now had unanimous 	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support from Britain and all other nations.  “No events less horrible,” wrote the paper, 
“could have strengthened our hand so powerfully.”234  Although the paper dismissed the 
revolt as an isolated incident within the Bengal Army, its support for the displacement of 
the EIC and a stronger hand for Britain in India suggest that the rebellion was indeed a 
general insurrection.  While it certainly could not have been both, the contradiction 
presented by the Economist demonstrates the liberal ideology that the installation of 
political economy could not have elicited anticolonial sentiment among Indian subjects.  
By repressing the rebellion, the paper stated, “we are preserving for the Hindoos social 
law, social morality, and keeping open their only access to a deeper civilization. We are 
subduing that conflagration of passions…we are witnesses for order against violence and 
murder; for labourious commerce against grasping avarice.”235  The remilitarization of 
the colonial state was necessary, then, to preserve the liberal order that was required for 
the development of ‘backward’ races that had not yet succumbed to the influence of such 
commerce.  All European nations see, claimed the Economist, 
How helpless are the Indian races to restrain their own superstitions and their own 
passions – that no reverence for law, and civil order, and social obligations, 
adequate for the rudest form of self-government, is yet written in their minds – 
that all their superficial civilization must unravel at once, unless a far steadier and 
stronger hand hold among them the scales of justice.236 
  
For the Economist, the mutiny-rebellion revealed an “ungovernable” element 
within Indian society, which was driven by the desire to overcome the economic, social, 
and political conditions of liberal governance.237  The British sought to contain this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Ibid.   
235 Ibid.   
236 Ibid.   
237 Ibid.   
	   70	  
unpredictability, in many cases, though mass killing.  As further described by John 
William Kaye in his History of the Sepoy War, subjects were killed “amidst every 
possible indignity that could be put upon them by our soldiers under the approving smiles 
of their officers.”238  Similar to the contradiction presented by the Economist, the 
indiscriminate killing described by Kaye speaks to how the preservation of colonial order 
– and its supposed benefits to all – in India was combined with a peculiar mix of terror.  
“Our chief source of solicitude,” wrote Kaye with reference to such episodes of violence, 
was to “improve” the “social condition” of subjects, “and in all respects to administer 
their comfort and welfare.”239  
 The British also sought to control Indian subjects by harnessing natural science 
and increasing their knowledge of race.  The generation of this knowledge was aided by 
the creation of an industrial capitalist system that integrated Indian peasants into the 
modern world economy.240  As Theodore Koditschek explains, much of European 
colonial discourse before 1850 focused on race as a fixed category.  People of colour 
were viewed as backward, but innocent “children,” in need of instruction and guidance 
from their more culturally sophisticated brethren of a whiter skin, in order to prepare 
them for the modern market age.241  But in the period between 1775-1850, the colonial 
metropolis of London was drawn into an accelerating vortex of revolutionary economic 
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and demographic change.242  The driving forces behind this industrial revolution were the 
factory, steamship, and railroad – which dramatically changed the organization of British 
colonies.243  This massive demographic and industrial growth demanded biopolitical tools 
of normalization in both colonial frontiers and the metropolis.  Industry was thus to act in 
service of the needs of ‘life’ – as a means to maintain governance over populations.  But 
as the economic value of India became increasingly apparent to British liberals, it also 
became harder to rule, because resistance, as the mutiny-rebellion demonstrates, became 
more effective and intense.244  It was thus “no accident” that a corresponding enlargement 
of British natural science and ethnology followed the globalization of British capitalism, 
and static views of race were replaced with a more evolutionary form of thinking.245  
While it may appear that this shift was enabled by the ascendancy of the ‘scientific 
racism’ associated with ‘social Darwinism,’ the influence of this doctrine can easily be 
overstated.  Published in 1959, Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species – a work 
grounded in genuine scientific inquiry – was diverted for ideological ends in the second 
half of the nineteenth century in efforts to naturalize racial inequality.246  Although 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory was drawn on by certain sectors of Britain’s imperial 
project, it is misleading, argues Koditschek, to view this change as a product of racialized 
science.  Instead, the application of pseudo-science in the British Empire grew out of the 
processes of social and economic change that preceded it.247  In India, colonial ethnology 
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was shaped by the demand to maintain liberal political economy as a form of governance 
in the postemancipation era of British imperialism.   
 George Campbell was an ethnologist whose thinking was deeply affected by the 
mutiny-rebellion.  He believed that a greater knowledge of Indian races was essential in 
the maintenance of British rule.  Campbell was in fact an advocate for colonial 
knowledge of all kinds.  Language, for example, was essential to Campbell’s schema:  “I 
do not think that any man can really understand the natives who is ignorant of their 
language and is thus altogether debarred from communication with them.”248  More 
importantly, though, Campbell’s work linked the perceived economic capacities of Indian 
subjects to their race.  “Perhaps the most important point in distinguishing the character 
of different races,” wrote Campbell, “is that of industrial energy.”249 
Race itself thus became an object of progress in the colonial order.  Racial 
categorization was enhanced in the 1840s and 1870s through the founding of 
anthropological associations that sought to reclassify a host of alien ‘others’ whose 
newfound proximity to the liberal world rendered them essential to the realization of the 
Greater British scheme.250  Campbell was by all means centered in this development as 
an imperial scholar.  Among his numerous works that classified Indian races, his essay 
titled “On the races of India as Traced in Existing Tribes and Castes,” published in The 
Journal of the Ethnological Society of London, particularly embraced this racial ideology.  
This essay argues, first of all, that “the larger acquaintance we are obtaining of the pre-
Aryan population, ought to have important bearing on the destinies of our Indian Empire, 
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it is an imperative duty to elevate these long-oppressed races, to enable them to assume 
their just position in the regeneration of their country.”251  Here, Campbell is speaking to 
the races of “highest civilization” in India – most related to white people, as identified by 
their physical characteristics and apparent industrial energy.   It was these “neglected 
people,” who, because of their “truthfulness, honesty, and bravery,” should be 
incorporated into the colonial regime, because their racial characteristics “afford the best 
materials for useful administrators and faithful soldiers.”252  Campbell’s schema of racial 
categorization denoted “Aryan” races as most closely related to Europeans.  “Hindoos” 
represented the next stage of the imperial hierarchy, followed by a plethora of races in the 
category of “uncivilized.”  “In the North,” wrote Campbell, “we have a caste called 
Khatrees…an extremely vigorous and energetic race, and a great support to the country.  
By them almost exclusively is capital accumulated and circulated.253  Campbell clearly 
embraced the evolutionary theory of race, writing, “the black aboriginal tribes found in 
the centre and South of India, certainly supply links to the history of mankind.”254  
Furthermore: 
It will suffice for me to say, that they may be generally characterized as small, 
slight, and dark, with very thick prominent lips, and faces which to the most 
casual observer cannot for a moment be mistaken for those of Hindoos or other 
Aryans.  Many of the tribes are in the very lowest stage of barbarism; in fact, are 
modern representatives of one of the earliest phases of the history of mankind – 
human beings who live in the woods almost without civilized arts, and without 
clothing of any kind beyond the occasional use of a vegetable tassel, scarcely 
equal to the fig leaves used by our original parents in their degraded condition.255 
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 It is these races, in contrast, that need improvement and correction in order to fit 
the liberal norm. According to Campbell, “certain political characteristics are indelibly 
stamped on particular races,” and “those who are open to Western government are along 
the surest path of civilization.”256 Campbell was of the opinion that the political 
development of the races of India compared with that of Britain, began from the same 
point.  Based on this, he asked, “Why should the East not be raised to a similar level of 
progress?  Why, commencing from a similar level, should it not be raised as the West had 
been raised?”257  For Campbell, there were certainly signs to point to India’s “progress,” 
noting that many “tribes” had adopted the arts of agriculture and industry and make the 
best labourers.”258  It was this sort of classification and racial ideology that underwrote 
the colonial state in the mid nineteenth century.  As Koditschek notes, “By applying the 
new techniques of evolutionary and ethnological study, the liberal imperialist could 
discern the racial character of a given people. And thereby devise the precise regime of 
discipline by which they could be most controlled.”259  The type of knowledge generated 
by Campbell, in other words, was to serve as a guide to determine which races were 
capable of being reintegrated into the liberal order, and which needed to be excised all 
together.   
The Economist, like Campbell, became a proponent of such racialized theories of 
economic production and justice.  In an article titled “The Economic Value of Justice to 
the Dark Races,” the Economist presents a schema for the organization of labour 
according to the inherent qualities of certain races.  This article, published in the wake of 	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an anticolonial revolt in Jamaica, is ripe with the liberal moralism of the 
postemancipation era.  Slavery, as the Jamaican revolt demonstrated to the Economist, 
was no longer viable in a world dominated by liberal ideals.  No longer viable, moreover, 
as a means to maintain colonial labour, which needed to be secured at all costs.260  But 
the Economist recognized the efficacy of slavery, stating that “for the mere execution of 
great works cheaply no organization could be equal to that which placed the skilled 
European at the top, and made him the despotic master of the half-skilled black or copper 
coloured labourer below.”261  But this system also had moral and social consequences 
entirely injurious to ‘civilization.’262  Vested in the evolutionary logic of this period, the 
Economist argued that “the one necessity essential to the development of these new 
sources of prosperity is the arrangement of some industrial system under which very 
large bodies of dark labourers will work willingly under a very few European 
supervisors.”  The argument put forward in this article is that economic incentives needed 
to be provided.  This argument helped to justify the liberal control of colonized peoples 
because they were apparently treated equally.  But the “justice” provided by British 
supervisors was not enacted according to fixed ideas of justice, but rather in terms of 
what was appropriate to different races on the evolutionary scale.  It was not simply a 
matter of providing wages where earned, but how to completely and properly administer 
“dark races.”  According to the Economist: 
It is quite certain that for the next hundred years the average black will not catch 
up to the average white, that for that space of time white leadership will save 
time, power, and money.  Fortunately for the world there is no mental reluctance 	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to accept that leadership.  Some dark races such as the Bengalese, honestly prefer 
it, as less worrying than their habit of indecision – others as the Chinese recognize 




An Asiatic…does not deny the justice of allowing his employer to fine him as an 
Englishmen would, but insists that before he is fined he shall have committed a 
fault which he previously knew would be so punished.  An African is not irritated 
because larceny is punished with flogging, though an Asiatic is, but he wants a 
fair hearing first.  In fact, he wants to be assured that he is subject to a law, 
however severe, and not to individual caprice.264 
It was through such as system of racialized administration that the Economist argued 
would allow the British to mobilize “dark races,” such as those in India, to labour without 
disruption or revolt – an objective made even more pressing with the mutiny-rebellion.   
 The clearest example of this racial ideology was in the British manipulation of the 
Indian caste system – a process that connected the physical characteristics of certain 
castes to the “occupational and social character of all its constituent members.”265  As 
such, certain castes were identified as ‘martial.’  Meaning, they possessed certain 
characteristics – echoing Campbell’s observation – that were conducive to the functions 
of the military.  Whereas some races were said to labour well, others were identified as 
‘criminal.’ As the basis of civil society in the post rebellion colonial state, caste not only 
reinforced what the British thought to be essential qualities of a given group, but also 
legitimized the exclusion of Indian subjects that refused biopolitical subjugation.266  
Supposed ‘criminal tribes’ were vilified for being ‘lazy’ and ‘unproductive,’ and became 
the target of an increasing colonial interventionism.  Above all, they represented a rival 	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alternative to the liberal organization of Indian society.267  The solution, according to the 
Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, was to assimilate these deviant subjects to a regime of 
private property and convert them into productive members of the economy.268   The 
policy reflected the alleged ability of liberal colonialism to reclaim ‘savage’ peoples from 
their ‘criminality.’  As Kaye described the 1821 conquest of a region in which “neither 
life nor property were secure:” 
It was a matter of astonishment to behold the rapid change produced by the liberal 
system of Government, in a race of miserable beings, who without a rag to cover 
their backs, were now fat and sleek and decently clad…The Bheel now feels a 
relish for that industry which renders subsistence secure, and life peaceful.269 
 
 The revolt had a significant effect on liberal ideology in the mid nineteenth 
century.  It led to an incremental perspective on racial development that helped the 
British to question whether racial ‘others’ could be transformed into liberal subjects at all.  
It demonstrated that even ‘semi-civilized’ races under British rule could ‘degenerate’ 
back into savagery.270  The Criminal Tribes Act, as a measure taken in the post rebellion 
state, signified the attempt to salvage the civilization of deviant Indian subjects, while 
those whose actions lay beyond liberal governability were further marginalized.   
 It should come as no surprise, then, that those castes that remained loyal to the 
British during the rebellion were praised because their labour conformed to the colonial 
order. The Economist stated “with that confident sense of authority which enables our 
stronger race to lead the willing and not ungrateful Hindus wherever the latter have 
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neither sufficient leisure nor sufficient organization to gain by effective concert the 
strength which in individual character they do not possess.”271  In the post-rebellion state, 
the system of labour and production envisaged was directly linked to the production of 
knowledge.  As the Economist stated: 
It is not only individual labour which is required, but organized labour, labour so 
scientifically arranged that the maximum of result shall be obtained at a minimum 
of cost, that immense sudden efforts, such as are required in tunnel cutting, cotton 
picking, and many other operations, shall be possible without strikes or 
quarrels.272 
 
Here, the paper implies that the knowledge of supposed racial attributes permits a 
‘scientific’ organization of labour that considers what certain races are good at and how 
they should correspondingly be awarded.  In “The Economic Value of Justice to the 
Darker Races,” the Economist notes that “strikes,” and “those accidental temptations to 
desert work,” were a great impediment to the maintenance of labour and production in 
India.  A new scientific management of labour was thus needed after the rebellion as a 
means to prevent this, as well as outright revolt.  In order to remove such “deterrents,” 
what was necessary, “as might have been expected,” was a system “based upon perfect 
freedom and mutual self-interest.”273  The interest of Britain, that is, in maintaining its 
colonies and cultivating their resources, and the interests of Indian subjects, who, if 
treated correctly according to their racial attributes, would become the biopoliticized 
subject that self-regulates and governs without disrupting the liberal order.  The 
Economist championed the implementation of such liberal forms of labour management: 
The Indian railways, for example, have had, all circumstances considered, 
wonderfully little difficulty obtaining labour.  The contractors were generally 	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sensible persons, who resolved that wages should be paid as in England and half-
savage tribes, quite as capricious as Negroes and far fiercer, when they found out 
that fact, came in to work with docile regularity.274 
This should be viewed in terms of the pacifying role that institutionalizing labour 
was said to have.  Whereas, “the dislike caused by the sense of compulsion produces too 
much laziness, too much cheating, too many revolts, and too many deaths to be profitable 
to the state which employs it, even in the pecuniary sense,” a system that enforced 
“justice” was preferable. 275  
Although knowledge had played a role in the British rule of India from the outset, 
from the appropriation of India’s history, to the “mapping” of India’s geography, it took 
on a decidedly different form when it was discovered to be insufficient in the 
maintenance of rule.  The Indian mutiny-rebellion signified that an even deeper 
knowledge was compulsory.276  As Nicholas Dirks notes, “after the rebellion, historical 
knowledge increasingly yielded to anthropological knowledge.”277  Ultimately, during 
this period of racial knowledge, “the colonized subject was first and foremost a body, to 
be known, and controlled through the measurement and interpretation of subjects 
organized into categories of caste.”278  This was at once physical/racial and 
social/economic.  While political economy had always served as a central component in 
the making and managing economic relations, in 19th century India, it became a method 
for understanding and organizing race as well.279  Although J.S. Mill did not comment on 	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race to the same degree as colonial ethnologists such Campbell, or the Economist, he did 
allude to it in Principles of Political Economy.  Race, for example, factors into J.S. Mill’s 
critique of unproductive labour.  In a fashion typical of nineteenth century political 
economists, J.S. Mill insisted that ‘productivity’ is eased and encouraged by “natural 
advantages.”280  “Successful production,” continues Mill, “like most other kinds of 
success, depends more on the qualities of the human agents, than on the circumstances in 
which they work.”281  For J.S. Mill, those who possessed the lowest “energy of labour,” 
were indigenous, colonized, and enslaved peoples – Native Americans, Africans, and the 
“barbarous” subjects of British India.  “Industrial excellence,” and “efficiency of labour,” 
on the other hand, was an inherent quality of the English character.282  Although J.S. Mill 
was in favour of maintaining EIC rule in India, his writings nevertheless reflect the 
authorization of violence, and the measures enacted by the regime to pacify Indian rebels 
by inducing them to labour.  “Uncivilized races,” wrote Mill, “are averse to continuous 
labour of an unexciting kind.  Yet all real civilization is at this price; without such labour, 
neither can the mind be disciplined into the habits required by civilized society, nor the 
material world prepared to receive it.”283  
British racism and colonial ethnology thus served as a means to separate which 
forms of life were fit for the production and continuation of liberal order and which were 
not.  This process was definitive of the biopolitics that formed the colonial civil society in 	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India.  Here, Foucault’s comments on race in Society Must be Defended are particularly 
relevant.  According to Foucault, racism is essential to the operation of biopower.  This is 
not because biopower espouses any particular racist ideology, but rather because racism 
itself is derived from the biopolitical logic of classification.284  According to Foucault, 
race is: 
Primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under 
power’s control, the break between what must live and what must die.  The 
appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the 
distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are 
described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior:  all this is 
a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls.  It is a way of 
separating out the groups that exist within a population.285 
 
He goes on to say that “racism justifies the death function in the economy of 
biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically 
stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or population, insofar as one is an element 
in a unitary living plurality.”286  This does not mean physical death only.  As Foucault 
clarifies:  “When I say killing I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also 
every form of indirect murder:  the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk 
of death for some people, or quite simply political death, expulsion, rejection and so 
on.”287  In India, the “death” of colonized subjects certainly involved cases of outright 
murder, such as the state’s immediate response to the mutiny-rebellion.  But it also 
involved the systematic exclusion of those subjects who the British could not reassimilate 
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into the liberal order, and thus constituted a biopolitical threat.  This speaks to the 
argument that the liberalism informing colonial rule in India did not universally serve 
human life by unchaining it from oppressive conditions, whether they are social, political, 
or economic.  It rather operated as a strategy to enhance human capabilities, inevitably 
excluding those forms of life that did not conform to its narrowly defined account of 
humanity.  The colonial forms of knowledge generated in India were thus used to 
perform a “necropolitical audit” of ‘life.’  Necropolitical, that is, in the sense that colonial 
rule in India was inseparable from efforts to eliminate forms of life that were perceived as 
inimical to the reproduction of the species.  Race became the primary marker of life’s 
eligibilities for inclusion within the liberal order.288 
  This chapter has explained how race became the primary tool for control of India 
during the aftermath of the mutiny-rebellion of 1857.  As the writings of the Economist, 
and George Campbell demonstrate, the effort to promote life in nineteenth century India 
demanded an albeit distorted epistemology through which the British judged subjects on 
their ability or reluctance to perform the labour required of them in a marketized colonial 
economy.  Ultimately, the British sorted life into racially inscribed categories as a means 
to decide who can live and who must die in order to preserve biopoliticized life from that 
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CONCLUSION:  THE CIVILIZATION OF SPECIES-BEING 
In this thesis I have argued that colonial rule in India during the nineteenth 
century – first by the EIC from 1793 to 1857, and from the British Government then on – 
was essentially a biopolitical project driven by a uniquely liberal conceptualization of 
what it is to be human.  This project had its origins in the early history of liberalism 
beginning in the eighteenth century, when modern liberal regimes sought to secure 
human welfare.  This occurred simultaneously while the categories of political and 
juridical existence that defined monarchial authority were replaced by the category of 
biological existence.  It was the category of biological – all that is living – that provided 
liberalism with its claim to be the sole purveyor of human well-being.  This, in turn, 
drove liberal regimes, particularly Britain, to expand its reign in foreign territories in the 
pursuit of ‘peace.’  The goal of this liberal colonialism, in other words, was to eliminate 
‘threats’ to the universality on which liberalism was founded, and render ‘other’ forms of 
life compatible with the logistical demands of a liberal society.   
This argument stands in contrast to narratives that understand the purpose of ‘late’ 
European colonialism to be the extraction of raw materials and the exploitation of labour.  
This was certainly an important aspect of colonial rule in India, but that Britain expanded 
its territory to fulfill its own materially driven agendas, however, is not an adequate 
explanation for an entirely contradictory phenomenon.  It ignores the explicitly stated 
principles of liberalism that apparently give rise to its pacific aims.  Or it assumes, at 
least, that the principles of individual liberty, equality, and democracy were readily 
abandoned in the face of Britain’s material aggrandizement.  This is far better explained, 
I argue, by showing how the ideals of liberalism were instead embedded in Britain’s 
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‘civilizing mission.’  It was precisely the motive to liberate humanity from arbitrary 
authority, in other words, which engendered violent intervention into non-liberal 
societies.   
To help explain this historical paradox I have developed a theoretical framework 
informed by the thought of Michel Foucault.  According to Foucault, liberal modernity 
was shaped by efforts to promote and enhance the capabilities of human life.  To govern, 
that is, by providing for the well-being of society and reducing its exposure to conditions 
of violence.  This was aided by an increasing scientific knowledge of human life and the 
emergence of “population” as an object of control.  To administer population not only 
required developments in medicine and education, but also political economy as a new 
area of inquiry.  This is evident in the eighteenth century explosion of literature in 
political economy, which collectively argued that the progress of society was best served 
through managing and maintaining proper population levels.  It was also determined that 
population was most effectively controlled through conceptually attaching life processes 
to systems of material production.  The rise of industrial capitalism, then, not only 
allowed life to flourish with expanding material possibilities, but also acted as a model 
into which life itself was inserted and organized around.  To quote Foucauldian scholar 
Melinda Cooper, from the late eighteenth century on “political economy [analyzed] the 
processes of labour and of production in tandem with those of human biological 
reproduction – and sex, and race, as the limiting conditions of reproduction will lie at the 
heart of biopolitical strategies of power.”290 
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 The emergence of biopolitics though, as Foucault demonstrates, led to an 
intensification of violence against forms of life that did not exhibit these ‘productive’ 
properties.  In the History of Sexuality, Foucault notes that biopolitical violence reached 
its height in the state racism of Nazi Germany.291  And indeed, there were numerous other 
examples of mass violence during the twentieth century, biopolitical or otherwise.  
However, although biopolitics was by no means unique to liberalism – with Nazism and 
Soviet Russia being examples of fascist and authoritarian applications – there is no 
liberalism, importantly, that is not biopolitical.  This is because liberalism, as a form of 
political, social, and economic organization, was from its outset, uniquely tasked with the 
protection of human life, for which it relies on a continually evolving knowledge.292  The 
history of liberalism is thus problematized, and comes to a head when confronted with 
the parallel history of the violence it has perpetrated.  For this reason, a theoretically 
sophisticated framework was necessary.  With the help of Foucault, in other words, I 
have been able to make a new argument in historical scholarship.   
 Foucault, however, was notorious for omitting discussions of modern power with 
reference to European imperialism.  In my view, though, Foucault’s concept of 
biopolitics translates to the colonial experience as well.  It is a means to explain the 
violence inherent to colonial intervention and rule, and the subsequent forms of 
dispossession and brutality it entailed.  This thesis thus addresses the paradox of liberal 
modernity through a case study in the history of colonialism.  This is useful in developing 
an argument about how colonialism was not an aberration, but an integral part in the 
development of liberal technologies of government.  Not chosen arbitrarily, though, India 	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serves as an excellent example for many reasons.  Although not unique to India, the 
biopolitical organization of society through liberal political economy was essential to 
Britain’s colonial regime in the nineteenth century.  Furthermore, there are certain aspects 
of India’s colonial histories that require more theoretically driven approaches than the 
historiography provides.  My methodology is thus not only a point of departure with 
Foucault – whose thought I argue beyond – but also with existing literature on colonial 
India.   
 To elucidate this argument, I have provided evidence from the writings and 
thought of British liberal philosophers, political economists, and ethnologists.  Beginning 
with the context of the Scottish Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, I discussed the 
thought of classical political economist Adam Smith.  Smith’s vision of a peaceful 
society – or “system of natural liberty” – hinged on fostering the entrepreneurial abilities 
of human beings.  To free, that is, the creative potential of humanity from the restraints of 
autocratic rule.  For Smith, this was a step in the ‘progress’ of society, which reached its 
highest stage in “commercial civilization.”  In such a stage, human actions were guided 
by their self-interest, and regulated by the “invisible hand” of the market to create a state 
of social harmony.  Interestingly, although Smith was vested in the logic of ‘progress’ 
and ‘civilization,’ he argued against imperialism.  He saw the British colonies in the 
Americas and the EIC’s mercantilist ventures in Asia as a manifestation of the type of 
power that obstructed commercial development.   
Building on the logic of liberalism found in the thought of Smith, I then discussed 
how the opposition that liberalism held toward colonialism was increasingly transformed 
throughout the nineteenth century.  James Wilson, the long term editor of the Economist, 
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and John Stuart Mill were both political economists directly influenced by Smith, and 
part of a new generation of nineteenth century liberals who encouraged colonial rule in 
‘backward’ societies.  Influential in their own right, the writings of the Economist and 
J.S. Mill are particularly important because of the close connection they each had with 
the EIC administration.  Their work thus not only illustrates the core aspects of 
liberalism, but also how they viewed the development of liberal society in India.  The 
Economist, for example, was adamant that if India was left uncolonized, it would pose a 
danger to human welfare – in India and beyond – because of the influence of “Oriental 
despotism.”   It can be argued that the Economist advocated colonial rule for its own gain.  
The paper certainly represented Britain’s privileged class, whose wealth was fuelled 
through the exploitation of British colonies.  But the paper always reflected what was at 
least ostensibly a concern for the subject population.  This was not simply a disguise.  
The benefits Britain received from the introduction of liberal political economy in India 
was rather a by-product of the need to organize Indian society according the universal 
principles of liberalism.   
 The dispossession that resulted from the permanent settlement of Bengal and the 
construction of railroads in India was thus necessary in order for the EIC to develop its 
‘indirect rule’ as a form of liberal governance.  The paper was definitely wrong about the 
reasons for increased production in the nineteenth century.  It was not a result of Indian 
subjects’ newfound self-interest, but rather the taxation of land in the Zamindari model of 
property.  Nevertheless, the Economist understood the formation of capitalism in India to 
create a new class of Indian consumers, and ‘improve’ their overall well-being of colonial 
subjects.  Similarly, J.S. Mill believed that colonial rule over ‘backward’ subjects was 
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necessary in order to induce them to labour.  For J.S. Mill, the ability to be productive 
served as an end in itself in the development of the “civilized form of life.”293  For this 
reason, J.S. Mill was in favour of the Raiyatawari model of property that also spread 
throughout colonial India.  Although it was only marginally different than the Zamindari 
system in the sense that it also encouraged peasants to produce more for the market, the 
direct control of the land that the Raiyatawari system granted Indian peasants was seen by 
J.S. Mill as more beneficial.  In this system, peasants themselves became the agents of 
social progress.  This productivity was necessary in order to overcome the ‘indolence’ of 
‘backward’ races that obstructed the smooth functioning of liberal society, and its 
benefits that apparently extended to all.  J.S. Mill was also guided by liberalism’s 
inherent concern for, and promotion of human well-being.  He felt, though, that securing 
this status should come at any cost, whether it is ‘despotic’ or peaceful.   
 Importantly, this colonial discourse held that Indian subjects were to realize their 
self-interest through the increased market orientation of production.  The chronicler John 
William Kaye believed that the newfound ability of Indian peasants to pursue their own 
material gain, as opposed to serving their traditional ‘masters,’ would allow them to be 
self-governing.  The influence of liberal political economy alone would compel subjects 
to perform the functions necessary to liberal society.  These conditions would 
successfully establish the ‘indirect rule’ of the colonial regime.  But if subjects were 
reluctant to accept the ‘civilizing’ influence of liberal political economy, argued Kaye, 
the colonial regime should violently intervene until such habits were effectively learned.  
This was the case with the Indian mutiny-rebellion of 1857.  The revolt demonstrated that 
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liberal political economy was antithetical to the welfare of Indian society.  Its threat 
required the direct intervention of the Government of India, culminating in the 
establishment of ‘direct’ colonial rule by the British government.   
 On this point, the writings of British ethnologist George Campbell were 
particularly insightful.  Campbell believed that in order to maintain liberal governance 
over Indian subjects, a deeper knowledge of race was important.  The threat posed by the 
mutiny-rebellion, in other words, exposed the shortcomings of liberal rule up until 1857.  
Thus, in order to re-establish a successful form of rule that did not simply rely on 
violence, the regime needed a better understanding of the aptitudes of its subject races.  
The ethnological work of Campbell represented the movement to link the perceived 
industrial capacities of Indian subjects to their racial and physical characteristics.  His 
writings provide an example of the racial categorization that occurred during the 
“anthropological turn” of the post 1857 era.   These categories served to inform the 
regime of what races best embodied the ideal liberal subject that was supposedly created 
through the installation of liberal political economy.   
 These main arguments of the colonial discourse formed by the Economist, J.S. 
Mill, Kaye, and Campbell, reflect the liberal demand to biopolitically organize society:  
to create, in other words, the conditions most favourable to the maintenance of liberal 
subjects.   The abilities to labour, consume, and self-govern under the influence of liberal 
political economy, were seen as the only way to preserve and protect liberal order.  The 
reproduction of this order subsequently expanded the capabilities of human population, 
which was ‘improved’ through the ‘progress’ of commercial society and material 
prosperity.  While the body of work produced by these writers was immense, and much 
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more could be made of their overall arguments, I have chosen to deal with the sources 
most pertinent to colonial India in the nineteenth century.  If this discourse were dissected 
further, in other words, there would appear a variety of specific views on progress, 
improvement, security, capitalism, and race.  With that said, each of these writers shared 
a commitment to an Orientalist worldview.  Their formulas for the development of India 
were inspired by a deep seated sense of European cultural superiority.  Importantly, the 
dichotomy between ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’ that these writers represented was not 
used as a simple excuse to justify colonial rule.  Rather, although it did aid the 
rationalization for colonial actions, their racialized discourse of inferiority had its roots in 
the origins of liberal modernity.  It was founded on liberalism’s direct opposition to any 
other form of organization.  As liberalism developed from the eighteenth century and 
throughout the nineteenth century, it became ever more pressing to colonize because of 
the weight of its universalism.  The concern for subject populations that liberalism exudes 
does not therefore stem from a legitimately compassionate position.  It instead stems 
from the ability ascribed to liberalism to universally secure the well-being of humanity.  
This is something these liberal writers grappled with.  There is a preoccupation evident in 
their work with how to properly oversee this process without governing ‘too much.’  
Excessive authority, it was determined, could be used when subjects were resistant in 
accepting and adapting to liberal political economy.  It was those who were deemed 
incompatible with the liberal demand to live ‘peacefully’ that were excised.  This was the 
process of how humanitarian impulses translated into violence – an essential aspect of 
biopolitics and the colonial experience in India.   
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 The reading of theses sources provided in this thesis reflects the historical changes 
that occurred in nineteenth century India.  The biopolitics of British intervention in India 
also manifested itself in numerous ways.  It began with the initial rupture of the EIC’s 
conquest of Indian territory.  This territory eventually became a site for the installation of 
liberal political economy, which was to benefit the people of India and save them from 
the grip of ‘Oriental despotism.’  As discussed, the Zamindari model of property 
ownership that resulted from the EIC’s permanent settlement of Bengal was designed to 
teach Indian peasants to work for themselves.  In reality peasants were taxed in order to 
fund the colonial regime.  The ongoing dispossession and exploitation of peasants was 
nonetheless necessary for capitalism to succeed.  Above all, the institution of colonial 
property regimes – Zamindari or Raiyatawari – created an idealized world in which 
Indian subjects were supposedly empowered.  The harder they worked, the greater access 
they would have to imported European commodities.  This was important because in 
modern liberal society, the production, circulation, and consumption of material goods 
come to replace the role of government.294  Or rather, “government” takes the form of 
providing for people who are free to pursue their own well-being.  The biopolitical 
organization of Indian society that describes the historical changes of the nineteenth 
century was also aided by the construction of railroads.  In a similar fashion to the 
taxation of land, Indian subjects also essentially paid for the development of this 
technology in the subcontinent.  Railroads were a means to facilitate the administration of 
the region.  Quite literally, of course, as they enabled the swift transport of officials and 
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the military, increasing the presence of the colonial regime.295  Railroads also provided 
for the circulation of wealth and correct movement of society.  They were a technology of 
progress, developed to advance the supposedly ‘static’ position of Indian subjects.   
 The Indian mutiny-rebellion was a direct result of this reorganization of society.  
The influence of liberal political economy created a diffuse form of ‘indirect rule.’  As 
such, the revolt was comprised of many diverse grievances that were in one way or 
another connected to British presence.  This breach in colonial sovereignty created 
awareness that certain expressions of living were fundamentally incompatible with liberal 
order.  To identify these threats with more ‘accuracy,’ there was an effort to increase 
knowledge of Indian races.  The manipulation of the Indian caste system during the 
aftermath of the mutiny-rebellion served to inform the Government of India which races 
were prone to certain behaviours; which, in other words, were ‘industrious,’ ‘martial,’ or 
‘criminal.’  Those who did not adapt to liberal order through their participation in the 
revolt and who could not be reintegrated into the system of production were viewed as 
inimical to the maintenance of liberal order, and were incarcerated or killed.   
 The suppression of the mutiny-rebellion thus signified a turn in the development 
of biopolitics in colonial India.  The demand for the colonial regime to codify Indian 
races contributed to the understanding of human beings as part of a biological species.  
This transformation required power to be exercised on the biological mass that constitutes 
the species rather than individuals.  A technology, as Foucault explained,  
Which is centered not upon the body but upon life, a technology which brings 
together the mass effects characteristic of a population, which tries to control the 
series of random events that can occur in a living mass, a technology which tries 
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to predict the probability of those events (by modifying it, if necessary) or at least 
to compensate for their effects.296 
 
This categorical change, and its corresponding technologies of government, did not occur 
independently of the colonial experience.  It instead grew there, and was used to reinforce 
colonial authority, inasmuch as India was a zone of experimentation.  Foucault, who did 
not comment on imperialism in depth, surprisingly noted this connection.  According to 
Foucault: 
At the end of the sixteenth century we have, if not the first, at least an early 
example of political structures of the West.  It should never forgotten that while 
colonization, with its techniques of political and juridical weapons, obviously 
transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable 
boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the 
apparatuses, institutions and techniques of power.  A whole series of colonial 
models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could 
practice something resembling colonization…on itself.297 
 
Although Foucault did not develop this idea in any systematic fashion, he was right that 
liberal technologies of government were not simply exported from Europe to the colonial 
world.  They rather developed within the imperial continuum between colony and 
metropole, and had a considerable effect on European statecraft.  This is evident in the 
fact that the first British census – as a means to codify the population – was preceded and 
modeled on the Indian census of 1872, which was introduced by the British as a means to 
further survey the subject population, and an integral aspect of colonial rule in the post 
1857 era.298  The Indian census, which categorized race and caste, is thus an example of 
how colonial practices literally informed the development of liberalism by expanding 
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knowledge of what is to be governed.  This had cultural inputs as well.  As Edward Said 
has argued, the whole of liberal European identity, or that which constitutes ‘Europe,’ 
was dependent on constructing the non-European ‘other’ as its enemy.299   
 As a final point of conclusion, I argue that British colonial rule did not violate the 
species life of Indian subjects.  In what is commonly understood by critics as a form of 
‘de-humanization,’ colonial subjugation can be argued to be an “enterprise that mandated 
the reduction of the native to a status below that of an animal.”300  However, through my 
examination of colonial India from 1793 to 1857, I have determined that British racism 
was instead the product of a biopolitical logic to which the ‘humanity’ of Indian subjects 
was formative.  This argument does not seek to diminish the horrors of colonialism; 
indeed, my ideological stance could not further oppose the historical existence of colonial 
regimes.  Instead, it emphasizes the devastating effects that occur when the improvement 
of life becomes the object of a political strategy.  Far from being an accomplishment, the 
knowledge developed by the British in India about how to order society by subjugating 
life to the principles of liberal political economy produced irreconcilable antagonisms 
because of the simple fact that life is not a datum.  The rationality to codify living beings 
and reduce their existence to the instruments necessary to guarantee their survival 
represented a contested assault on the natural indeterminacy of life.  This is, as the terror 
endured by Indian subjects in the nineteenth century demonstrates, the tragedy of liberal 
modernity.   
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